Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Nietzsche’s Polychrome Exemplarism
Authors: Alfano, Mark
Keywords: Nietzscheexemplarvirtuevicemoral psychologydigital humanities
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Mark Alfano, "Nietzsche’s Polychrome Exemplarism", in "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2018) XX/2", Trieste, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2018, pp. 45-64
Journal: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 
Part of: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2018) XX/2
Abstract: In this paper, I develop an account of Nietzschean exemplarism. Drawing on my previous work, I argue that an agent’s instincts and other drives constitute her psychological type. In this framework, a drive counts as a virtue to the extent that it is well-calibrated with the rest of the agent’s psychic economy and meets with sentiments of approbation from the agent’s community. Different virtues are fitting for different types, and different types elicit different discrete emotions in people with fine-tuned affective sensitivity, making Nietzsche’s exemplarism doubly pluralistic. Exemplars show us how a type is expressed in different social and cultural contexts. Some live up to the full potential of their type, while others are stymied and demonstrate how pernicious influences can wreck a person’s psychology. While some exemplars inspire admiration that leads to emulation, others elicit a range of other emotions, such as envy, contempt, and disgust. If this is right, then Nietzschean exemplarism offers a richer, more evaluatively and motivationally nuanced moral psychology than the monochrome admire-and-emulate model currently popular.
ISSN: 1825-5167
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2018) XX/2

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
04_ALFANO.pdf265.11 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record

CORE Recommender

Page view(s)

Last Week
Last month
checked on May 25, 2019


checked on May 25, 2019

Google ScholarTM


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons