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Title: Un riesame della teoria esemplarista delle emozioni
Authors: Niccoli, Ariele
Keywords: Exemplarismadmirationemotionsperceptual theorymoral knowledge
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Ariele Niccoli, "Un riesame della teoria esemplarista delle emozioni", in "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2018) XX/2", Trieste, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2018, pp. 123-142
Journal: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 
Part of: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2018) XX/2
The aim of the paper is to reassess the theory of emotions held by exemplarism, in order to
clarify the epistemic burden assigned to admiration. I will show that the emotion of
admiration is understood in three different meanings, (i) admiration as a kind of moral
sense, (ii) admiration as a reflective disposition with an emotional component, (iii)
admiration as a proper emotion, understood as a direct perception of moral excellence.
Then, I will discuss the main strength and weakness of the perceptual analogy as for the
epistemic role of emotions. I will conclude by claiming that the three notions of admiration
can hardly be accommodated in the same theoretical framework, and that exemplarism
would greatly benefit by discriminating between them in order to define with more
accuracy the epistemic role played by the emotion of admiration.
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2018) XX/2

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