Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/24720
Titolo: A Brief Abductive Argument for Theistic Ethics
Autore/i: Schönecker, Dieter
Parole chiave: Moral factsmoral intuitionsmoral naturalismtheistic ethics
Data: 2019
Editore: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Citazione: Dieter Schönecker, "A Brief Abductive Argument for Theistic Ethics", in "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/1", Trieste, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2019, pp. 61-74
Journal: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 
Abstract: 
I shall develop an abductive argument for the claim that the best explanation for moral facts such as One ought not to rape and kill innocent children for sexual pleasureis that moral norms and values are grounded in God’s will. I will first explain (1) the Moral Question, i. e., the question of why one should be moral at all. I will provide a brief outline of the possible answers to this question and show why most answers fail; here, I will have a closer look at moral naturalism. I will then, secondly (2), contend that the only answer to the Moral Question is theistic: Only God can provide or rather: can be the foundation of morality. Furthermore, I shall argue that only on the basis of a personal God that has a will who sets ends the very idea of moral normativity makes sense. I will conclude with some brief remarks on moral epistemology.
Tipologia: Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/24720
ISSN: 1825-5167
DOI: 10.13137/1825-5167/24720
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale
È visualizzato nelle collezioni:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/1

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