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Title: Collective Action, Constituent Power, and Democracy: On Representation in H. Lindahl’s Philosophy of Law
Authors: Fossen, Thomas
Keywords: Representationdemocracyconstituent powercollective actionlaw
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Thomas Fossen, "Collective Action, Constituent Power, and Democracy: On Representation in H. Lindahl’s Philosophy of Law" in: "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/3", EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, Trieste, 2019, pp. 383-390
Journal: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 
This contribution develops two objections to Hans Lindahl’s legal philosophy, as exhibited in
his Authority and the Globalization of Inclusion and Exclusion. First, his conception of constituent
power overstates the necessity of violence in initiating collective action. Second, his rejection
of the distinction between participatory and representative democracy on the grounds that
participation is representation is misleading, and compromises our ability to differentiate qualitatively
among various forms of (purportedly) democratic involvement. Both problems stem
from the same root. They result from conflating two distinct senses of ‘representation’: actingfor-
someone (or representative agency) and portraying-something-as-something (or representation-
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
DOI: 10.13137/1825-5167/29513
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/3

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