Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/29519
Title: Utility, Priorities, and Quiescent Sufficiency
Authors: Corvino, Fausto
Keywords: Capabilitiesincomemarginal utilityprioritarianismquiescent sufficientarianismthresholdwelfare
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Fausto Corvino, "Utility, Priorities, and Quiescent Sufficiency" in: "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/3", EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, Trieste, 2019, pp. 525-552
Journal: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 
Abstract: 
In this article, I
firstly discuss why a prioritarian clause can rescue the utilitarian doctrine from
the risk of exacerbating inequality in the distribution of resources in those cases in which utility
of income does not decline at the margin. Nonetheless, when in the presence of adaptive prefer-
ences, classic prioritarianism is more likely than utilitarianism to increase the inequality of re-
sources under all circumstances, independently of the diminishing trend of utility. Hence, I pro-
pose to shift the informational focus of prioritarianism from welfare to either social income or
capabilities in order to safeguard those who are worse off . Following this, I argue that we may
have reasons to limit the aggregative logic of priority amended utilitarianism through one or more
sufficiency thresholds, an d that we can partially defuse the negative thesis objection that is usually
levelled against sufficientarianism, provided we interpret the threshold(s) as valid only as long as
everyone is led above it.
Type: Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/29519
ISSN: 1825-5167
DOI: 10.13137/1825-5167/29519
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/3

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
24_Corvino.pdf345.18 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show full item record


CORE Recommender

Page view(s)

41
checked on Oct 20, 2020

Download(s)

13
checked on Oct 20, 2020

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric

Altmetric


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons