During the last several decades, the legislative work of national and international institutions has been promoting the protection and conservation of what the dictates of law define as cultural heritage. What is, however, an asset properly belonging to such heritage? What a worthless burden? Does this distinction presuppose a subjective judgment or an objective skill? To address these and other questions is necessary that philosophical inquiry consider the problem of the essence of cultural assets and the selection procedures of the protected heritage by tracing the outlines of a new discipline: the ontology of cultural heritage. This line of research, emerging today, presents itself as a branch of ontology endowed with great application potential thanks to the combination of the most advanced results of anthropology, informatics and law studies with those of social ontology, semantics, and mereology.
Crispin Wirght (born 1942) is a British philosopher whose works cover fields like the philosophy of language and mathematics of Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein (in both cases, through the influence of Michael Dummett's thought), the debate between realism and anti-realism, vagueness, first-person knowledge of mental states, and skepticism. By promoting novel and promising research programs (here outlined in their essentials) in all these areas, Wright stands out as one of the most authoritative figures in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Within the liberal theory, the idea of neutrality of the State is a criterion to manage and solve religious or moral conflicts arising in pluralistic contemporary democracy. In this essay I will pursue three main goals: to analyse the internal complexity of the concept of neutrality; to clarify the kind of problems to which the principle of neutrality should be applied; to identify the form of liberalism (political liberalism) whose the principle of neutrality is at the basis. I will also refer to the idea of equal respect as a ground on which such a principle could be defended.
Behavioural economics, or behavioural game theory, tests with an experimental methodology some fundamental hypothesis of economic theory, as the emergence of cooperation, altruism and social equality. The study of social norms and social conventions represents then a particular domain of investigation inside this broader paradigm. Specific evolutionary theories illustrate and confirm behavioural results obtained in this domain. This article presents the concept of social norm in behavioural economics, shedding light on empirical investigations and methodological questions about this subject.
Is there any entity in virtue of which the proposition that Aphex is an on-line philosophical Review is true? Entities of this kind, if any, have been called “Truth-makers”: truth-makers are those entities that make propositions true. The debate on truth-makers has been one of the focuses of the philosophical discussion in the last twenty years: notions such as truth-maker and making-true seemed in fact to be able on the one hand to build a bridge among different branches of philosophy, such as the theory of truth, ontology and metaphysics, and, on the other hand, to bring new life to the time-honoured, but by the time out of fashion, correspondence theory of truth. In what follows the principal lines of the debate on truth-makers and truth-making will be highlighted. The debate has focused on two main questions: 1) what is the content of the very notion of “making true”? That is to say: what is truth-making? 2) Are there truth-makers? What kind of arguments can be provided in favour of the existence of entities of such kind?