L'esternalismo del contenuto
How do we individuate the content of our mental states? According to externalism, the content of (some of) our mental states depends, at least in part, by factors external to the individual, i.e. factors involving not only the brain and the body but also the external environment. Since the tem “externalism” is a very general label that applies to a variety of very different positions, in this paper I will distinguish between, on the one hand, the semantic content of intentional states (beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes), which is conceptual and referential and, on the other hand, the phenomenal content of conscious states (perceptions, bodily sensations, emotions, moods), which is qualitative and experiential. On the basis of this classification, I will treat separately semantic externalism and phenomenal externalism.
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Cristina Amoretti, "L'esternalismo del contenuto", in "APhEx 7", 2013, pp. 33