21 APhEx num 21, anno 2020

Nel 1945 Friedrich Waismann introduce la nozione di open texture o porosità con riferimento alla natura dei concetti ordinari: secondo Waismann, un concetto non può mai essere introdotto in maniera tale da risultare definito "in tutte le direzioni possibili"; al contrario, le definizioni sono "sempre correggibili o modificabili". La nozione waismanniana suscita una rinnovata attenzione nel dibattito contemporaneo, in particolare in relazione alle questioni del cambiamento concettuale, della vaghezza, dell'esplicazione, dei concetti formali, e della cd. ingegneria concettuale; questo breve contributo presenta un problema aperto per la tesi che i nostri concetti, specialmente quelli logici e matematici, esibiscono open texture.

Philosophers often follow a method according to which a thesis or theory that is more in accordance with common sense must be preferred to positions that are less in accordance with it, at least as long as it is not shown that that thesis or theory is inadequate and some opposing position is an adequate substitute for it. The present contribution offers a characterisation of the notion of common sense usually employed in contemporary philosophical debates; a critical illustration of the main methods that can be used in order to determine philosophically relevant contents of common sense; a clarification and a justification of the philosophical method of the appeal to common sense; and, on the other hand, an illustration of some argumentative strategies that can be applied by those who endorse some thesis or theory in discordance with common sense.

Stanisław Leśniewski (1886 –1939), Polish logician and philosopher belonging to the first generation of the Lwów-Warsaw School, contributedto the elaborationof the so-called developmentalLogics. His main research areas wereMathematical logic and Philosophy of logic. Since 1914, he elaborateda formal mereology, an extensional theory of the relations between parts and wholes that is currently the ground of many recentdevelopments in contemporary ontology and metaphysics. My aim is to present Leśniewski'slong ignored ideas and to show theircomplexity and original features throughthe critical presentation of his main works.

The main idea of distributed cognition is that a complete explanation of some cognitive phenomena should take into account non-local factors, i.e. processes that take place beyond the traditional cognitive boundaries represented by the "skin and skull" of cognitive subjects. This work outlines the developments of this viewpoint with regard to the study of linguistic phenomena. The proponents of the distributed approach highlight the active and dialogical features connected to the acquisition and use of natural language. A serious consideration of these phenomena provides the means for an original explanation of some language-related developmental issues that in computational linguistics are unsatisfactorily solved by supposing the existence of innate cognitive structures.

This paper offers a critical introduction to moral epistemology, that is, one of the emerging disciplines within metaethics and epistemology. The main sections of this contribution are devoted to addressing the three following issues: first, whether it is possible to acquire moral knowledge; second, how – viz., through which sources – we can acquire moral knowledge; and third, which implications moral epistemology draws from empirical sciences.