Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/31734
Title: Das Seiende als Seiendes. Materiale, immateriale e formale nell’ontologia di Nicolai Hartmann
Other Titles: Das Seiende als Seiendes. Material, Immaterial and Formal in Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology
Authors: Sain, Andrea
Keywords: ontologymaterialimmaterialeventHartmann
Issue Date: 2020
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Andrea Sain, "Das Seiende als Seiendes. Materiale, immateriale e formale nell’ontologia di Nicolai Hartmann", in "Esercizi Filosofici 15", 2020, pp. 54-66
Journal: Esercizi Filosofici 
Part of: Esercizi Filosofici
Abstract: 
The aim of the paper is to offer an analysis of the three following notions: material, immaterial and formal in Nicolai Hartmann’s Ontology. Firstly, I explore the Hartmann’s critique of the merely material and merely formal ontology. The attempt is to offer a definition of the categorial pair composed by matter and form, in the context of the entire categorial system. Furthermore, I try to describe the role of matter in the categorial laws (kategoriale Gesetze), in particular the law of matter (das Gesetz der Materie). The purpose is to show the project of a general formal ontology and the current importance of Hartmann’s ontology in continuity with the Husserl’s third logical investigation. Nonetheless, a pure formal intepretation of ontology presents limits based on the underlying immateriality expressed by the privileged form of the event (Ereignis).
Type: Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/31734
eISSN: 1970-0164
DOI: X
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale
Appears in Collections:Esercizi Filosofici 15, 2 (2020)

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