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|Title:||Epistemic Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and Reasonable Pluralism||Authors:||Baccarini, Elvio||Keywords:||Epistemic democracy; epistocracy; public reason; Rawls||Issue Date:||2021||Publisher:||EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste||Source:||Elvio Baccarini, "Epistemic Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and Reasonable Pluralism" in: "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2021) XXIII/1", EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, Trieste, 2021, pp. 375-386||Journal:||Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics||Abstract:||
After presenting some of Cerovac's theses (2020), the article explains some challenges to the criticism of all forms of epistocracy that he developed. The objections are expressed through the employment of some elements of Rawls's conception of public justification, more precisely of public reason. It is remarked that Rawls's theory of public reason has two sides. One is rep-resented by the characterization of reasonable disagreement. The other side is represented by the fact that disagreement is not reasonable in all cases. In such situations, limited forms of so-phisticated epistocracy are justified.
|Type:||Article||URI:||http://hdl.handle.net/10077/32040||ISSN:||1825-5167||Rights:||Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale|
|Appears in Collections:||Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2021) XXIII/1|
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