Options
Husserl sui concetti specificamente normativi
Staiti, Andrea
2021
Abstract
In this paper I explore Husserl's theory of specifically normative concepts (in contemporary idiom: thin normative concepts) as presented in his lectures on ethics. In the first section I examine Husserl account of normative judgment in the Prolegomena. I argue that it is insufficient because it doesn't appreciate the irreducibility of normative to non-normative concept. In the second section I turn to Husserl's later account of normative concepts and explicate the meaning and significance of his claim that such concepts invariably refer to posita or Sätze, rather than ordinary objects. I also explain how, on Husserl's account, the normative stance that makes specifically normative concepts possible can be extended to ordinary objects and acts of consciousness. I conclude with some remarks about the significance of Husserl's analysis for metanormative theory.
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Andrea Staiti, "Husserl sui concetti specificamente normativi" in: "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2021) XXIII/2", EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, Trieste, 2021, pp. 369-386
Languages
it
Rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale
File(s)