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Title: The Sources and Stances of Moral Normativity
Authors: Bagnoli, Carla
Keywords: MoralitynormativityobligationKantKorsgaard
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Carla Bagnoli, "The Sources and Stances of Moral Normativity" in: "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2021) XXIII/2", EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, Trieste, 2021, pp. 397-414
Journal: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 
This paper argues against the view that the issue of moral normativity is best accounted by undertaking the first-person deliberative perspective. Section 1 characterizes Korsgaard’s self-constitutivist view of moral normativity in contrast to skepticism and contractualism. Section 2 highlights the role of the value of humanity in the self-constitutivist view. Section 3 formulates an issue about the sources of moral obli-gations to others, which points to a tension within Korsgaard’s theory of moral obligation. Sections 4-5 show that the dominance of the first-person deliberative stance in accounting for moral normativity is related to the deployment of the strategy of reflective endorsement, which is not functionally equivalent to the self-constitutivist strategy for vindicating moral authority. Section 6 argues that endorsement un-derstood as an act of imaginative rehearsal fails to carry out the main insights of Kantian constructivism regarding normative discussion and the transformative potentiality of practical reasoning. Section 7, de-fends the importance of multiple stances to do justice to the complexity of moral normativity.
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
DOI: 10.13137/1825-5167/32392
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internazionale
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2021) XXIII/2

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