Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/5105
Title: La questione dell’antropologia nell’analisi fenomenologica
Authors: Costa, Vincenzo
Keywords: phenomenologyHusserlSchelerHeidegger
Issue Date: 2010
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Vincenzo Costa, "La questione dell’antropologia nell’analisi fenomenologica", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XII (2010) 2, pp. 137-163.
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XII (2010) 2
Abstract: 
The main task of a phenomenological approach to anthropology is that of clarifying its
main concepts through an analysis of experience. Focusing on appearance rather than on
introspective analysis, phenomenology is based upon a “givenness” which is independent
of any interpretation. Firstly, one should recognize that the intentional relation to the
world essentially differs in the cases of humans and animals. Animals don’t understand
any meaning: even the simplest human feeling is specifically different, since man is a
conscious being, who is able to interpret it. The “world” is the possibility condition of any
object and, as such, the origin of human understanding. Phenomenologists criticise other
approaches, such as Cohen’s Neokantianism: according to Heidegger, the self-relationship
of a subject is the source of his responsibility. An agent’s identity requires a totality of
possibilities, i.e. a “world”. Accordingly, as Patočka noticed, animals neither act, nor do
have a self. Human language has a fundamental role, because it allows the subject to take
a certain distance from himself and then, properly speaking, to act.
Type: Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/5105
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2010) XII/2

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