Options
Subiect Against Procedure: the Argument of Following a Rule in the Second Wittgenstein
Seddone, Guido
2009
Abstract
This paper attends to treat the question about the “following a rule” in the philosophy of
the second Wittgenstein and to connect it with the relation between pragmatics and semantic.
In the philosophical Investigations this argument (§§ 185-142) represents the culmination
of the attempt to elucidate the concepts of use, meaning and understanding, which are
introduced in the previous paragraphs. I mean to show that the rule, designed like a sign
which indicates how take an action, is an inscrutable fact if we don’t insert it in a precise
context of human practices and behaviour. This inscrutability of the rule and of the sign
raises an apparent contradiction: the rules make possible our lived but they have not sense
if considered alone. Such dependence of the rules on the practices is mutual because it’s impossible
thinking a practice without a rule. The connection rule-practice, that is treated
similarly as the relation meaning-use, permit us to introduce the follow arguments my paper
will consider: holism of the rule and of the meanings, the question about the understanding
and the recognizing of rules and meanings, finally the question about the agreement in the
actions.
Series
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XI (2009) 1
Subjects
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Guido Seddone, "Subiect Against Procedure: the Argument of Following a Rule in the Second Wittgenstein", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XI (2009) 1, pp. 412-426.
Languages
en
File(s)