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Title: Sidgwick on Virtue
Authors: Shaver, Robert
Keywords: Sidgwickvirtuehedonism
Issue Date: 2008
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick on Virtue", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, X (2008) 2, pp. 210-229.
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
X (2008) 2
Sidgwick’s arguments for hedonism imply that virtue is not a good. Those arguments seemed
to many wholly unpersuasive. The paper analyzes them, focusing also (especially in the final
Appendix) on many changes Sidgwick made on chapter XIV of Book III through the various
editions of the Methods. From an analysis of the first sections of this chapter, it emerges that
Sidgwick employed two different argumentative schemes, one against the view that virtue is
the sole good and the other against the much more diffused claim that virtue is one of the
goods. These arguments can be fully understood in the context of Sidgwick’s general claim
that only “desiderable conscious life” is good. Sidgwick’s general point is that virtue, insofar
as it is valuable as an end, is so because of the feelings or consciousness associated with it.
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2008) X/2

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