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Title: Neurofilosofia, naturalismo e statuto dei giudizi morali
Authors: Di Francesco, Michele
Keywords: naturalismneurosciences
Issue Date: 2007
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Michele di Francesco, "Neurofilosofia, naturalismo e statuto dei giudizi morali", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, IX (2007) 2, pp. 126-143.
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
IX (2007) 2
Recent developments in the neuroscience offer an increasing amount of “brain-based” explanations
of decision-making in ethics (and economics). Are those explanations more basic
than the psychological, “social” or philosophical ones? In my paper I address this question
analyzing the meaning of “because” in sentences like “when someone is willing to act
on a moral belief, it is because the emotional part of his or her brain has become active
when considering the moral question at hand” (M. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain, 2005, p.
167, emphasis added). My answer is a pluralistic one. I reject brain-fundamentalism and I
argue that neuroscientific developments support a moderate form of naturalism, according
to which empirical results may indirectly influence moral reflection, but offer no direct evidence
to radical reductive naturalism.
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2007) IX/2

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