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Title: Spinoza, l’individuo e la concordia
Authors: Cristofolini, Paolo
Keywords: Spinozaindividualconcord
Issue Date: 2004
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Paolo Cristofolini, "Spinoza, l’individuo e la concordia", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, VI (2004) 1, pp. 1-15.
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
VI (2004) 1
Abstract: Concord may be recognised in the relationship between individuals living under the guide of reason; however it must be planned within society intended as a whole. Spinoza investigates this asymmetry: although society is a fundamental need and, for any rational human being, the best form of common living is the one lead by reason, the vast majority (multitudo) does not live under the guide of reason, but rather under the guide of passions. Those interpretations that attribute to the so called multitudo some form of spontaneous self-organised democratic wisdom, capable of ensuring a positive future, are to be considered mystical. The appendix to part IV of Spinoza’s Ethics clearly demonstrates that concord is possible only within the relationship between single individuals, and that therefore man’s task is to educate others to reason. Concord, as freedom, is considered a “private” virtue not in a egoistical or possessive sense, but because only singles can achieve it and transmit it to others, whereas it can not raise spontaneously from some sort of collective individuality.
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2004) VI/1

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