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Spinoza, l’individuo e la concordia
Cristofolini, Paolo
2004
Abstract
Concord may be recognised in the relationship between individuals living under the guide of reason;
however it must be planned within society intended as a whole. Spinoza investigates this asymmetry:
although society is a fundamental need and, for any rational human being, the best form of
common living is the one lead by reason, the vast majority (multitudo) does not live under the guide
of reason, but rather under the guide of passions. Those interpretations that attribute to the so called
multitudo some form of spontaneous self-organised democratic wisdom, capable of ensuring a
positive future, are to be considered mystical. The appendix to part IV of Spinoza’s Ethics clearly
demonstrates that concord is possible only within the relationship between single individuals, and
that therefore man’s task is to educate others to reason. Concord, as freedom, is considered a
“private” virtue not in a egoistical or possessive sense, but because only singles can achieve it and
transmit it to others, whereas it can not raise spontaneously from some sort of collective
individuality.
Series
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
VI (2004) 1
Subjects
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Paolo Cristofolini, "Spinoza, l’individuo e la concordia", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, VI (2004) 1, pp. 1-15.
Languages
it
File(s)