Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/5532
Title: Modelli evoluzionistici del contratto sociale
Evolutionary models of the social contract
Authors: Festa, Roberto
Keywords: social contracttheory of games
Issue Date: 1999
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Roberto Festa, "Modelli evoluzionistici del contratto sociale" in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics I (1999) 1
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
I (1999) 1
Abstract: 
In a recent book on The Evolution of Social Contract, Brian Skyrms shows how evolutionary game theory can be used to explain how the implicit social contract we live by might have evolved. In this paper, after describing the main lines of Skyrms’s approach, we will examine some problems arising from it, on the basis of a comparison with von Hayek’s evolutionary view. Finally, we will make some remarks on the possible relevance of the outcomes achieved by Skyrms for the studies on the ‘bounded rationality’.
Type: Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/5532
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (1999) I/1

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