La tematica del corpo nelle psicologie filosofiche ‘realistiche’ del primo Ottocento tedesco: Herbart, Fries, Schleiermacher

Abstract

The paper explores the relationship between body and soul in the psychologies of three German philosophers at the beginning of the 19th Century: J.F. Herbart, J.F. Fries and F.D.E. Schleiermacher. Their positions on the issue appear to be different in many way. Herbart is cautious about introspection and speaks against an identification between soul and human life; on that way, he comes close to typical contents of the Cartesian-rationalist tradition, such as the simplicity and immortality of the soul, as opposed to the mortality of the body. Fries charges Herbart with the accusation of an uncritical conception of soul. His solution is based on considering the psychological and the somatic dimensions of man as two different ways of representation, trying thus to mediate between the Leibnizian “parallelism” theory and the Kantian criticism, while from the practical points of view, however, Fries supports the doctrine of the simplicity and immortality of the soul. Schleiermacher tries to overcame a radical opposition of soul and body, and also as a theo-logian, Schleiermacher does not defend a complete independence of the soul from the body, but rather their reciprocal nexus in the flesh.