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Title: L’oggetto del desiderio conteso fra Darwall e Rawls
Authors: Ottonello, Irene
Keywords: RawlsDarwallmoral psychologyautonomydesire
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Irene Ottonello, "L’oggetto del desiderio conteso fra Darwall e Rawls", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XIV (2012) 1, pp. 323-343
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XIV (2012) 1
The practice of reason-giving normally belongs to our everyday life. People involved in
this practice acknowledge each other as persons, and in turn reasonably ask each other for
justification regarding our respective actions. However, if we ask why these persons
provide reasons for their respective actions, or in what grounds they should do certain
things, the answer is neither easy nor obvious. In this paper I want to consider the
meaning of “desire”, “will”, and “autonomy” within Darwall’s and Rawls’s respective
works. I claim that both Darwall and Rawls hold that moral psychology plays a
fundamental role in grounding justified reasons for acting (and for coming into the
reason-giving practice). Furthermore, I suggest that Darwall differently grasps Rawls’s
moral psychology, placing more value on the will, rather than desire, as well as
envisioning a more or less robust notion of “autonomy”. My aim is to show that, pace
Darwall, Rawls has a different position about desire, its object, and the value of the will,
one which enables us to ground the reason-giving practice on “weaker” assumptions.
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2012) XIV/1

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