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Title: Libertà del volere e concetto di persona nella filosofia dello spirito di Hegel
Authors: Cafagna, Emanuele
Keywords: free willpersonphilosophy of mind
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Emanuele Cafagna, "Libertà del volere e concetto di persona nella filosofia dello spirito di Hegel", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XIV (2012) 2, pp. 68-102
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XIV (2012) 2
Hegel’s definition of ‘free will’ and ‘person’ gets over a phenomenological or psychological definition of these concepts. My essay explains how Hegel justifies the placing of his theory of free will in a philosophy of Mind analyzing the concept of ‘recognition’ in the Phenomenology as a section of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences as well as the main steps of The practical Spirit, the second part of the section Psychology. With regard to this last science my essay clarifies the essential differences between freedom of the will and freedom of choice. These differences only explain how the free will could develop as objective Spirit in the third science involved by Hegel towards a proper definition of freedom, i.e. the philosophy of Right. In the philosophy of Right as a part of Hegel’s System of philosophical sciences the free will finds its own adequate reality and the concept of a person can be explained without the mistakes caused by a phenomenological or psychological approach to it. Against some interpretations which identify Hegel’s definition of free will with communitarian practices, the final part of my essay focuses on the importance of the concept of a person to explain the general structure of the philosophy of Right.
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2012) XIV/2

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