

Relational autonomy in Practice: Autonomy between State, Law, Propaganda and Education

Lisa Bin

ABSTRACT

The article considers a relational account of autonomy in its multidimensional structure. It examines whether autonomy is compatible with four contemporary societal facets: state, law, propaganda, and education. It does so by juxtaposing relational theories with social anarchism. It contends that social-anarchism pin points the incompatibilities between contemporary societies and autonomy. Through the suggestions of Bookchin, Cossutta, Stanley, and Goodman, this study provides some alternative practices that are compatible with relational accounts.

L'articolo considera gli approcci relazionali all'autonomia, specificatamente nella loro struttura multidimensionale. Cerca di valutare se l'autonomia sia compatibile con quattro sfaccettature delle società contemporanee: stato, legge, propaganda e istruzione. Perciò, confronta le teorie relazionali dell'autonomia e il social-anarchismo. Quest'ultimo permette di individuare le incompatibilità tra le democrazie contemporanee e l'autonomia. Questo lavoro fornisce anche alcune pratiche alternative, compatibili con gli approcci relazionali, attraverso i suggerimenti di Bookchin, Cossutta, Stanley e Goodman.

RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ANARCHISM

This paper investigates the relationships between relational autonomy and social-anarchism and it is organized accordingly: in the first section, I justify the comparison between relational theorists and anarchism. Then, I proceed and analyze four aspects of contemporary society: state, legislation, propaganda, and education.

PAROLE CHIAVE

AUTONOMIA RELAZIONALE; ANARCHISMO;
STATO; LEGGE; PROPAGANDA;
EDUCAZIONE.

KEYWORDS

RELATIONAL AUTONOMY; ANARCHISM;
STATE; LAW PROPAGANDA;
EDUCATION.

Defying anarchy is difficult. Indeed, «identifying a beginning point that suits the spirit of the issue is challenging because anarchists often oppose categorizing their movement and ideals»¹. However, refusing an all-encompassing definition of anarchism does not imply a refusal of rational reasoning. It represents an atti-

¹ R. Kinna, *The Government of No One. The Theory and Practice of Anarchism*, London, 2019 p.13.

tude of general anti-dogmatism towards power and the way in which it is handled in a society. Despite the existence of many streams of anarchism, this paper refers to those philosophers who fall under the label of “social anarchism”.

On the other hand relational autonomy challenges the notion of autonomy as self-sufficiency and independence². It recognizes the role relation (familial, social, political) have in shaping autonomy-related competences. Specifically, in this paper I refer to Mackenzie’s multidimensional approach to autonomy. Or, autonomy is defined by three interconnected but distinct axes: self-determination, self-governance and self-authorization. The first

identifies external, structural conditions for individual autonomy, specifically conditions relating to freedom and opportunity. [...] This axis enables identification of the myriad ways that gender-based structural inequalities, injustices and forms of oppression constrict women’s freedoms and opportunities and thereby impair our abilities to lead self-determining lives³.

Self-governance, focuses on procedural conditions of autonomy and involves conditions such as self-reflection. Specifically, relational theorists focus on how oppression, gender based dynamics, or structural inequalities can influence such conditions. For instance

An asylum seeker incarcerated in a detention centre is vulnerable to mental illness [and so, his ability of self-governance and self-determination are threatened], but the sources of his vulnerability are his political and social circumstances⁴.

Then, self-authorization deals with self-evaluative attitudes agents possess. It rep-

2 C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar (a cura di), *Relational Autonomy Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self*, New York, 2000a.

3 C. Mackenzie, *Feminist innovation in philosophy: Relational autonomy and social justice*, in “Women’s Studies International Forum”, n.72, 2019, pp. 144-151.

4 C. Mackenzie, “The importance of Relational autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of Vulnerability” in *Vulnerability, New Essays on Ethics and Feminist Philosophy*, New York, 2014, p.38.

resent a requirement, held from within, of a general disposition of being answerable. It also has political implications: subjects who are the target of a specific propaganda - as immigrants - might not see themselves as worthy members of a community, despite working, paying taxes, or respecting the other members of a community.

One of the grounds for considering a comparison between relational autonomy and social anarchism is that are united by a fundamental assumption: the critique of an individualistic conception of the self. Let us consider Kropotkin’s *Mutual Aid. A Factor in Evolution*. Its central concept is the innately relational character of animals, and hence of humans, as stated by the law of mutual aid. Kropotkin observes, using instances from the animal world, that an individualistic conception of the self is incompatible with the facts provided by nature. As humans, we, like animals, develop communities that are preferable to isolation in terms of protection. Accordingly, the self is never unencumbered or isolated. Instead, it is always influenced by a certain social context that is essential for existence. Individualism disregards the importance of partnership in survival and practices of solidarity and care.

As a result, it provides a misleading perspective of humans. This point has been largely emphasized by relational scholars. Kropotkin, as well as relational theorists - does not suggest that agents are inherently social in the sense that they are always nice. Agents are relational in the sense that they belong to a net of relationships that defines and influences them. Or, as Emma Goldman put it:

there is no conflict between the individual and the social instincts, any more than there is between the heart and lungs: the one receptacle of the precious life essence, the other the repository of the element that keeps the pure essence of social life; society is the lungs which are distributing the element to keep life essence - that is, the individual - pure and strong⁵.

5 E. Goldman, *Anarchism: What It Really Stands For, in Anarchism and other Essays*, Durham, 2012, p.38.

Or, as relational theorists put it: agents «are premised on a shared conviction, the conviction that persons are socially embedded and that agents' identities are formed within the context of social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, gender and ethnicity. Thus, the focus of relational approaches is to analyze the implication of the «intersubjective and social dimensions of selfhood and identity for conceptions of individual autonomy and moral and political agency»⁶.

Both social anarchists and relational theorists call for social and political policies that enable actors to be autonomous. Or, they stress the fact that the environment in which people grow has an impact on their identities and their potential to achieve autonomy. In other words, «l'essere umano che l'anarchismo ha di fronte e al quale si rivolge, semplicemente è; nella sua complessità ed a questa complessità l'anarchismo si riferisce, non a sue rappresentazioni semplificate in funzione di un operare sul piano politico»⁷. Furthermore, both theories argue that an individualistic view of autonomy has been deeply influenced by liberal principles of self-sufficiency and independence. However, while some relational accounts of autonomy argue that autonomy is compatible with modern liberal societies⁸, anarchists argue that this is not possible.

To clarify why anarchist suggest that, I recall the arguments Robert Paul Wolff has used to argue against the representative principle and majority rule. However, a deeper analysis of why state and autonomy are not compati-

ble is the focus of the next section. Wolff has argued against both the majority rule and the representative system⁹. Concerning the representative system, he observed how

on what grounds can it be claimed that I have an obligation to obey the laws which are made in my name by a man who has no obligation to vote as I would, who indeed has no effective way of discovering what my preferences are on the measure before him? Even if the parliament is unanimous in its adoption of some new measures, the fact can only bind the deputies and not the general citizens who are said to be represented by them¹⁰.

According to Wolff's perspective, on the other hand, the majority rule's validity must still be proven. Not only so, but he adds that it is not a sensible criterion for a community's decision-making procedures. His main argument is that the majority principle does not maintain autonomy, even if agents voluntarily submit to such control.

I argue that relational theorists who defend liberal policies and do not radical question the pillars of liberal democracy, are failing to analyze whether the structure itself of contemporary democracy is compatible with autonomy. Only by re-thinking the way in which we organize our communities (Paragraph 1.2), the way they work (Paragraph 1.3 and 1.4) and how we value education (Paragraph 1.5) we can actually take seriously the commitments of relational autonomy.

Having established these premises, the following section deepens the critique of the State and explores why relational autonomy is incompatible with contemporary states.

6 C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar "Introduction. Autonomy Reconfigured" in *Relational Autonomy Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self*, New York, 2000a, p.4.

7 [The human being represented by anarchism simply is; the human being in all of its complexities, and anarchism relates to this complexities, not any simplified representations influenced by political conceptions]. M. Cossutta, *Errico Malatesta. Note per un diritto anarchico*, Trieste, EUT, 2014 p.141.

8 J. Christman and J. Anderson (a cura di), *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism New Essays*, New York, 2005.

9 I used Wolff's account since he provided an organized and structured critique to the representative and majority principle. For further readings on the topic see Godwin, *Anarchist Writings* and Robert Paul Wolff, *In defense of Anarchism*, or Lysander Spooner, or George Woodcock's critique of the representative principles.

10 R. P. Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism*, London, Oakland, 1998, p.29.

RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND THE STATE

The chapter focuses on Bookchin's critique of State. However, as Marco Cossutta has pointed the concept *State* is ambiguous. On the one hand it represents «la condizione di un paese nei suoi dati sociali e politici, nella sua costruzione materiale e, quindi, nel suo ordinamento. [...] Alla luce di quanto rilevato, qualsivoglia organizzazione di rapporti politici può essere designata con il termine /stato/»¹¹. According to this definition, the Greek *poleis* and Inca's empire, as well as the URSS, are all States, despite their differences. On the other hand, the State describes a particular form of political organization developed during the Thirteenth Century through the Nineteenth Century. Specifically, its three characteristic features are the *juridical* moment, the *political* moment and the *sociological* one. Accordingly, the first definition designates the *genus*, while the latter represents a *species* compared to the former. As a result, the characteristics of the states that anarchism has historically faced are highly different. When analyzing Bakunin or Proudhon's critique of the concept of State, for example, it is critical to recognize how they differ from contemporary anarchist. Thus the decision to focus on Bookchin's work, a rather contemporary thinker.

In *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* Bookchin argues that the origin of the states is rooted in the need to organize and divide the resources. This has also offered justification for class division and the patriarchal household: it has become a rationalization for the desire of one group to dominate the other. This intuition was further considered in another book, *The Ecology of Freedom*. The State here represents something other than the administrative structures that characterize modern states. It is a psychological condition, a behavioral tendency that influences governing structures.

11 [The state of a country in terms of its social and political identity, material construction, and hence order [...] According to this, the term /state/ can refer to any arrangement of political relations]. M. Cossutta, *Intorno alla critica anarchica dello Stato*, in "Tigor: rivista di scienze della comunicazione di argomentazione giuridica", (2016), n.2, Trieste, p.60.

Or, «the State is not merely a constellation of bureaucratic and coercive institutions. It is also a state of mind, an instilled mentality for ordering reality. Accordingly, the State has a long history – not only institutionally but also psychologically»¹². Thus, the State has two interconnected features: an *introjected* one and an *institutionalized* one. «Hierarchy, class, and ultimately the State penetrate the very integument of human psyche and establish within its unreflective internal powers of coercion and constraint»¹³. For a relational account to autonomy this is crucial in the sense that internalized effects of oppression shape agents' motivational structure, preference and ideas¹⁴. Or, they have emphasized on the impacts of internalized patterns of domination, saying that they can be harmful to the development of autonomy-related abilities or have a profound influence on agents' decisions, or their self-governing abilities. This is especially important when considering Friedman's understanding of agents' deeper concerns¹⁵. Deeper concerns are those that are frequently prioritized over others. They are, however, contingent on the relationships of a certain context. As a result, considering the anarchist critique of the state is significant. It emphasizes how agents' decision-making processes and commitments are deeply influenced and shaped in the kind of domination patterns perpetrated by states. Those same patterns that justify the general attitude of domination and hierarchy that characterizes the social relationships on which relational scholars focus, as abusive relationships, racial or gender discrimination.

Furthermore, western democracies have gradually absorbed other social functions, becoming indistinguishable from society. They

12 M. Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom. The emergence and the dissolution of Hierarchy*, Palo Alto, 1982, p.94.

13 *Ibidem*, p.115-116.

14 C. Mackenzie, See "Responding to the Agency Dilemma: Autonomy, Adaptive Preferences and Internalized oppression" in *Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression*, New York, 2015.

15 M. Friedman, *Autonomy, Gender, Politics*, New York, 2003.

arrange human life in all of its facets and establish the kind of opportunities agents have. That is to say they limit agents' self-determination since their self-determining opportunities depends on what is bureaucratically accessible to them. In other words, they restrict agents' autonomy as self-determination. Consider two children: one Italian, born in Italy to Italian parents, and the other born to parents with a migration background, who moved to Italy when they were toddlers. Even if the two children attend the same school, have the same friends, religion, and financial situation, and lead comparable lives, they will not have the same opportunity. The second does not have an Italian passport, and neither may vote when they reach the age of eighteen due to the statutes that govern citizenship.

Moreover, in contemporary capitalistic states, this pattern has become extremely pervasive. In the sense that

even economic categories become political categories. Domination fulfills its destiny in the ubiquitous, all-pervasive [capitalistic] State; its legacy reaches its denouement in the dissolution, indeed, the complete disintegration, of a richly organic society into an inorganic one – a terrifying destiny that the natural world shares with the social¹⁶.

Accordingly, even in its capitalistic form, a state is incompatible with relational autonomy: it perpetuates the pattern of dominance in several areas of society through the concept of consumption. It expresses such patterns in agents' demands, so that they do no longer represent actual concerns and ideals. Once again, agents introject oppressive dynamics and patterns that hinder the development of self-governing skills and deeper concerns. This, for instance, is also compatible with Bensons' account of feminine socialization and the oppressive patterns perpetuated by commercials or social standards towards women that hinder their autonomy related competencies¹⁷.

¹⁶ M. Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom. The emergence and the dissolution of Hierarchy*, cit., p.139.

¹⁷ P. Benson, *Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization*, in "Social Theory and Practice", (1991), n.17, pp. 385–408.

Another feature of contemporary societies is the growing importance of political parties, with the result that modern states could be considered as party-states. The role of political parties has serious implications for relational autonomy. They are not only closely related to the previously discussed majority rule and representation principle. Political parties are also in charge of determining agents' autonomy as a form of self-determination: they determine the types of opportunities available to agents. Considering the recent Right-wing victory in Italian elections and LGBTQ+ issues, we can see how a single path can severely (intentionally) constrain agents' opportunity conditions. By not equating same-sex marriages to so-called traditional marriages, for example.

I underlined two axes of relational autonomy while studying Bookchin's analysis: self-determination and self-governance. It may appear that Bookchin's account excludes autonomy as self-authorization. This latter consideration, I contend, is correct. Western democracies, in particular, do not consider or encourage this latter aspect of autonomy. Agents do not need to have self-esteem, self-trust, or self-respect to be citizens. These traits are not required for autonomous agents. Instead, they are seen as personality traits.

To contemporary states, Bookchin opposes *libertarian municipalism* and *communitarianism*¹⁸. Libertarian municipalism involves a decision-making process that «is decidedly a confrontational form of face-to-face democratic, anti-statist politics»¹⁹. It tries to de-centralize politics and administrative systems in or-

¹⁸ Communitarianism involves [movements and ideologies that seek to transform society by «creating so-called alternative economic and living situations such as food cooperatives, health centers, schools, printing workshops, community centers, neighborhood farms, "squats," unconventional lifestyles, and the like [...]. It is not a politics but a practice, whose constituency is often a relatively small group of people who choose to buy from or work in a particular cooperative enterprise». As in M. Bookchin, *Thoughts on Libertarian Municipalism*, Institute for Social Ecology, 2000 < <https://social-ecology.org/wp/1999/08/thoughts-on-libertarian-municipalism/> >; Sito consultato in data 12/10/2022.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

der to rethink and, as a result, reorganize how power is transmitted.

This conception of agents presents them as autonomous: they can use their self-governing abilities to discover reasonable and equitable solutions to growing challenges in a community. They display the abilities that have been required from relational scholars in the literature²⁰ and they are in an environment that fosters those abilities. Furthermore, active participation in the community allows agents to be involved in the decision-making process for their opportunity conditions. As a result, they have a higher level of self-determination. Libertarian municipalism does not entail an all-encompassing State that makes decisions in all aspects of agents' life. To conclude this brief aside on libertarian municipalism, I'd want to point out that Camillo Berneri has evolved similar, or at least comparable, thoughts on libertarian federalism²¹. This literature could inspire further research on how we should organize communities to reflect the commitments of relational autonomy outside the realm of liberalism.

This section examined the concept of the State in order to determine its link to the three axes of relational autonomy. The following chapter will present an account of Law. The link between this chapter and the following is clear. The laws symbolize the authority in charge of a society's order. This section; however, is directly related to everything that follows. Given the distinctive trend of centralization of contemporary societies, it is not surprising that domains such as edu-

20 See D. Meyers, *Self, Society and Personal Choice*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, or C. Mackenzie, "The importance of Relational autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of Vulnerability" in *Vulnerability, New Essays on Ethics and Feminist Philosophy*, New York, 2014

21 For further readings on the topic see M. Cossutta, *Per un anarchismo attualista*. Murray Bookchin: dall'ecologia sociale al municipalismo libertario in "Tigor: rivista di scienze della comunicazione e di argomentazione giuridica", (2014) n.2. Or, Giampietro Berti, Giorgio Sacchetti (a cura di), *Un libertario in Europa. Camillo Berneri: fra totalitarismi e democrazia. Atti del convegno di studi storici*, Arezzo, 2007. As well as Camillo Berneri, P. Adamo (a cura di) *Anarchia e società aperta*, Milano 2006.

cation and propaganda are linked to the concept of State. That is, the authoritarian form of the State is linked to a pervasive attitude of dominance, which defines several aspects of contemporary cultures.

AUTONOMY AND LAW

The main reference I use to describe the concepts of law and autonomy is Marco Cossutta's work *Errico Malatesta. Note per un diritto anarchico* [Errico Malatesta. Annotations for an anarchic jurisprudence]. Before proceeding with the chapter, I briefly highlight the distinction between the concepts of *jurisprudence* and *law*. The first one represents a «genuina manifestazione di autonomia, indirizzata alla dialettica comune diverso, non comando eteronomo volto a limitare, attraverso il dispiegarsi di un potere irresistibile, le conseguenze negative di uno scontro tra arbitri»²². The second, on the other hand, defines the order imposed by the institutions in charge of a certain political system. As a result, the two are not only distinct terms, but also correspond to two distinct types of communities and, moreover, notions of agency. While jurisprudence can promote autonomy, laws have a strong authoritarian connotation and are unlikely to demonstrate relational autonomy.

According to Cossutta, the relationship between autonomy and law is unattainable due to the inherent qualities of the latter. Specifically, in a tradition that began with Marsilio da Padova and has since evolved through Hobbes, Locke, and legal positivism, the concept of law reflects the authority's order, which is required to achieve social peace. In this sense, as Enrico Opocher noticed «il diritto appare perciò alla coscienza contemporanea come il più tipico, per non dire il più importante, stru-

22 [Genuine autonomy, oriented to the dialectic between the common and the diverse, not a heteronomous command intended at limiting the negative repercussions of a battle of wills by the blossoming of an irresistible force.]. M. Cossutta, *Errico Malatesta. Note per un diritto anarchico*, cit., p.33

mento di *controllo sociale*»²³. This has severe implications concerning the connections between relational autonomy and the concept of Law. Considering, for example, self-determination, and its *opportunity condition*, Cossutta notices the fact that agents do not have a role in shaping them, since

gli ambiti di libertà sono relegati in luoghi ove non giunge il comando sovrano: *silentium legis, libertas civium*; il che equivale ad affermare che solo nel privato l'essere umano può tornare ad essere libero, cioè sregolato. Infatti, il *pubblico* è totalmente occupato dallo Stato e l'individuo è privato di questo spazio²⁴.

To put it another way, laws govern the types of opportunities available to agents. However, the participation of actors in such processes is not fully considered. Furthermore, this produces an unequal scenario in which the only agents capable of effectively establishing self-determining conditions in a certain society are those who contribute to the formation of laws - that is, the legislative power. These considerations recall, once again the problems with the representative and majority principle. Additionally, these problems are intertwined to topics such as citizenship and voting, or to the structures of political party. Once again, relational theorists are confronted with the problem of re-discussing radical issues of contemporary societies and their functioning to actually foster agents' autonomy.

Furthermore, laws do not promote autonomy as self-determination because of the anthropological assumptions that underlie this concept. Such views of legal relationships do not regard agents as self-governing or as lack-

23 [As a result, the law seems to modern awareness as the most common, if not the most significant, weapon of social control]. E. Opocher, *Lezioni di filosofia del diritto*, Padova, 1999, p.269.

24 [The domains of freedom are limited to locations where sovereign command does not arrive: *silentium legis, libertas civium*; this is to say that agents can return to being free, that is, uncontrolled, only in the private sphere of one's life. In fact, the state has completely taken over the public sphere, depriving the individual of this area.]. M. Cossutta, *Errico Malatesta. Note per un diritto anarchico*, cit., p.77.

ing the competence necessary. In other words, the modern legal tradition presupposes that actors cannot control themselves when left alone. Or they lack the capacities defined by relational theorists (for example, Mackenzie's capacity for practical reason or affinity)²⁵. Thus, neglecting agents' self-governing abilities is the reason that laws do not promote autonomy as self-determination. Moreover, the fact that the laws does not consider agents as self-governing recalls the connection between laws and *punishment*. As Hans Kelsen has pointed, the characteristic feature of the law is its association with sanctions. In other words, since modern jurisprudence is not assuming agents as autonomous «da qui il celeberrimo *homo homini lupus* di hobbesiana memoria, che fa sì che realmente libero sia solo colui che ha la forza di esserlo, ovvero di imporre il proprio potere senza essere coartato. È evidente come in questa prospettiva la libertà si congiunga con la forza»²⁶.

Also, by promoting this particular understanding of human natures, laws are inherently incompatible with self-authorization. Or they encourage self-authorization for one group at the expense of another. This is especially important because laws, in their creation processes, do not entail any form of dialogical interaction. In this view, agents have little opportunity to demonstrate their self-authorization abilities. The ability to engage in a critical discourse that demonstrates agents' responsiveness and self-governance skills, on the other hand, is a distinguishing quality of the autonomous agent²⁷.

25 C. Mackenzie, "The importance of Relational autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of Vulnerability" in *Vulnerability, New Essays on Ethics and Feminist Philosophy*, New York, 2014.

26 [As a result, the extraordinary Hobbesian motto *homo homini lupus* deems only those who have the strength to be such, or those who can impose their authority without being compelled, to be truly free. It is clear that in this perspective, freedom is inextricably linked to one's power.]. M. Cossutta, *Errico Malatesta. Note per un diritto anarchico*, cit., p.74.

27 Paul Benson, for instance, points at the fact that autonomous agents should hold themselves answerable – if not to others at least to themselves – because it means that they have actively embraced these commitments,

On the contrary, through the suggestions offered by Errico Malatesta's thought, Cossutta opens to the possibility of a *fluid jurisprudence* that can foster agents' autonomy. He suggests that:

l'autonomia dà vita, quindi, ad un processo auto-regolamentativo delle relazioni sociali essendo non solo la condizione per mezzo alla quale il soggetto pone le basi regolamentative del rapporto ma, nel contempo, è la condizione acciòché le parti possano dirimere le controversie operando, in tal modo, quel processo di ordinamento che rappresenta l'essenza stessa dell'esperienza dell'anarchismo²⁸.

The primary distinction between laws and jurisprudence is their source. If laws are instructions imposed by the authority on a community by an order²⁹, the concept of jurisprudence arises from the social processes that are unique to a certain society. In this regard, Cossutta's description is similar to the Italian processual tradition³⁰. These explanations

instead of passively absorbing them. In this sense, the test for self-authorization has the form of a dialogue – real or imagined one – where different point of views face each other's. This does not mean that to be autonomous, agents must critically value all their commitments, or reasons to behave. Self-authorization is more a kind of disposition that requires readiness to engage in critical reflection. P. Benson, "Free Agency and Self-Worth", in *Journal of Philosophy*, (1996), n. 12, pp. 650– 668.

28 [Autonomy, then, gives rise to a self-regulating process of social connections since it is not only the situation under which the subject establishes the regulatory foundations of the relationship, but it is also the condition under which the parties can settle disputes by acting. In this way, the act of arranging reality is the essence of both legal experience and anarchy.]. M. Cossutta, *Errico Malatesta. Note per un diritto anarchico*, cit., p.122.

29 For an analysis of the effects of order or commands on agents' identity see the next chapter. Or, more precisely, Stanley J., *How Propaganda Works*, Princeton, 2018.

30 See for instance Giuseppe Capograssi and Enrico Opocher who recognize that jurisprudence is defined during a trial and affirm that it depends on the values that belong to a community, not on an authoritative order. n a nutshell, those conceptions underline the fact that «affermare la processualità del diritto [...] significa, dunque, non già affermare un primato evidentemente assurdo del diritto processuale sul diritto sostanziale [...] ma, piuttosto, riconoscere che il diritto è in funzione alla possibilità di controversie che debbono essere definite in giudizio». [Claiming that the jurisprudence is processual [...] does not mean, therefore, affirming an absurd

acknowledge that jurisprudence is defined during a trial and that it is based on a community's values rather than an authoritative rule. Furthermore, jurisprudence involves a rejection of source centralization. By doing so, the author calls for the necessity to look for a «diritto il quale, sorgendo dal fatto concreto ed attraverso il concorso dei protagonisti dello stesso, possa ritrovare nei rapporti sociali e non in forze esterne la propria legittimità»³¹.

Agents are the advocates of the legal experience in this perspective, and they are portrayed as competent of doing so. While the concept of law reflects a negative anthropological premise, the concept of jurisprudence assumes that agents are capable of engaging in dialogical acts such as free agreement³², that is one of the main aspects of jurisprudence, next to regularity³³ and autonomy. It represents the «frutto del dire e del contraddire delle parti coinvolte nel processo di regolamentazione»³⁴.

primacy of procedural jurisprudence over the substantive one [...] but rather, recognizing that jurisprudence is based on the possibility of disputes that must be defined in court.]. In E. Opocher, *Lezioni di filosofia del diritto*, Padiva, 1999, p.293. Further reading, see E. Opocher *Il valore dell'esperienza giuridica*, Treviso, 1947.

31 [Jurisprudence that derives its legitimacy from concrete facts and the assistance of the actors involved, rather than from external influences.]. M. Cossutta, *Errico Malatesta. Note per un diritto anarchico*, cit., p.109.

32 As Bookchin has poited out, *free agreement* does not mean that one will do as one pleases, or that the agreement can be withdrawn according to each individual's whims. Ho noticed that a confederalism, and so the free agreement is still a binding agreement, and can not be canceled for voluntaristic reasons. As in M. Bookchin, *The meaning of Confederalism*, Anarchist Library, 2009 < <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/murray-bookchin-the-meaning-of-confederalism> >. Sito consultato in data:12 Ottobre 2022.

33 With *Regularity* Cossutta means «quell'insieme di comportamenti regolari che vengono determinati non dall'imposizione statale, ma dagli interessi e dai valori presenti in un dato contesto sociale». [that specific set of regular behaviours determined not by state imposition, but by the interests and values of a social context]. As in M. Cossutta, *Errico Malatesta. Note per un diritto anarchico*, cit., p.X.

34 [the consequence of the parties' affirming and refuting each other during the regulatory procedure]. *Ibidem*, p.XI.

After defining laws and jurisprudence, I clarify how jurisprudence is compatible with all three dimensions of autonomy. Firstly, autonomy is a prerequisite for a conception of jurisprudence. Jurisprudence require agents to be self-governing and to possess skills such as memory, volition, the ability to make life plans³⁵. Furthermore, it is compatible with the concept of self-authorization, because it assumes actors' ability to engage in a critical conflict. Furthermore, while acknowledging the jurisprudence's inherent processual aspect, this idea recalls the dialogic nature of self-authorization³⁶. Furthermore, individuals play a significant part in resolving the controversy. As a result, they determine the opportunities circumstances that are characteristic to their communities.

AUTONOMY AND PROPAGANDA

This section discusses the phenomenon of propaganda. It stresses its pervasiveness and illustrates its disruptive implications for relational autonomy. I follow Jason Stanley's account of propaganda. However, my focus is not on his theory of propaganda or philosophy of language, but on the implications for autonomy.

Stanley defines propaganda as a type of communication in which the message is incongruous with what is effectively delivered and creates a chance for some groups in a society to exploit others³⁷. Specifically, it contributes to the formation of flawed ideology that are particularly harmful, since

on the one hand, those benefiting from large material inequalities will tend to adopt flawed ideologies in the form of false legitimization narratives. [...] On the other hand, those suffering materially from large inequalities, via lack of land, access to high-status positions, or other obstacles to equality of opportunity

35 D. Meyers, *Self, Society and Personal Choice*, New York, 1989.

36 See note 25 on Benson and the dialogical nature of self-authorization.

37 J. Stanley, *How Propaganda Works*, cit., p.280.

and attainment, will be led to adopt a flawed ideology of their own inferiority³⁸.

This first aspect is particularly relevant to the concept of relational autonomy. Not only does Stanley's study of propaganda show how agents in modern society do not have the same opportunities conditions (and so that not all agents possess equally autonomy as self-determination). He also believes that by rationalizing the disparity, propaganda contributes to broaden it. Furthermore, an account of propaganda is especially important because propaganda spreads discreetly: it is not declared in modern society³⁹. Accordingly, those societies, conceal their management culture by hiding their ideology through the propagandistic discourse. They promote they values as an expression of allegedly democratic values such as equality and merit. Instead of fostering autonomy «in a managerial society, the greatest good [that is encouraged] is efficiency»⁴⁰. Thus, the managerial culture is masking «the gap between given ideal and reality by the propagandistic use of that very ideal»⁴¹. It does so, for example, when propaganda uses the traditional vocabulary of liberal democracy and covers the interests that are at stake during, for example, an election. Even if the candidates present themselves as bearer of particular values, they «do not differ from one another in their representation of the interests of wealth and power, though they often represent different corporate interests»⁴². Using propagandistic language to mask an antidemocratic environment is fairly widespread in contemporary civilizations, and Stanley uses the example of the United States of America, where a democratic vocabulary conceals a basically oligarchic structure.

38 *Ibidem* pp.28-29.

39 These considerations recall what Adorno and Horkheimer noticed concerning contemporary liberal societies and their relationship with the concept of ideology. That is, they present themselves as not-ideological, while promoting it subtly. See M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, London, 2016.

40 J. Stanley, *How Propaganda Works*, cit., p.41.

41 *Ibidem*, p.72.

42 *Ibidem*, p.39.

Moreover, propaganda sticks, modifies, and addresses agents' *deeper concerns*. Accordingly, it is particularly harmful to agents' skill self-governance. Or «propaganda is characteristically part of the mechanism by which people become deceived about how best to realize their goals, and hence deceived from seeing what is on their own best interest»⁴³. Likewise, Stanley defines demagoguery as propaganda that threatens a certain group of individuals (whether it is an ethnic, religious, or economic group). Or it is a kind of «speech that appears reasonable but serves the goal of decreasing reasonableness by representing a group in the society that is not worthy of empathy is always demagogic»⁴⁴. It weakens agents' self-determination when viewed through the lens of a relational approach to autonomy by reducing opportunities for a specific group. Furthermore, contemporary cultures do not recognize or encourage self-authorization since they do not value each member's point of view⁴⁵.

To further describe how propagandistic speech works, Stanley introduces the distinction between *at-issue content*, which represents what is at stake in a conversation, and *not-at-issue content*. The not-at-issue content «not-at-issue content is *directly* added to the common ground. For this reason, not-at-issue content is in general “not negotiable, not directly challengeable, and [is] added [to the common ground] even if the at-issue proposition is rejected»⁴⁶.

Presupposed contents, for example, are roughly always a kind of not-at-issue content. Not-at-issue contents are hardly debated or filtered due to their characteristics. As a result,

43 *Ibidem*, p.32.

44 *Ibidem*, p.139.

45 Anderson and Honneth consider the example of the stay-at-home dad, if in such case it is associated with unemployed rather than, caring, it might be difficult to see oneself as worthwhile, especially in a society that see man as the primary source of income in a family, or that overlaps one's job with one's worthiness. See in J. Anderson and A. Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Justice” in: *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism*, New York, 2005.

46 J. Stanley, *How Propaganda Works*, cit., p.153-154.

propaganda undervalues a targeted group's ability to self-govern through frequent association and non-issue material. This has an impact on agents and their preference ordering, as well as their relationship with their concern and, more specifically, the prioritization process underling them. This notion is important for a theory of relational autonomy. It pertains to agents' deeper concerns and their ability to develop a positive picture of themselves, both of which are necessary for self-authorization and self-governance. Additionally, the presence of substantially unequal relations influences the process of preference ordering. Or, «figures in the media, as well as teachers in schools, exploit their position as epistemic authorities to issue assertions that are not to be taken as proposals, but as commands»⁴⁷. Some agents present themselves as authorities. They introduce standard at-issue content that appears reasonable; however, they also introduce not- at-issue content that is not negotiable. This has the effect of imposing a preferred ordering on situations on the common ground of communication. Furthermore, not-at-issue-contents, in particular, have the same features as slurs, namely the capacity to perpetuate negative associations and affect agents' self-authorization.

Stanley's analysis then proceeds on to defining ideological beliefs, or beliefs that agents struggle to revise even when counter-evidence is presented. More precisely, ideological beliefs are «beliefs that are connected to one's identity, which one shares with others, [and that] will be hard to revise by one, because it is hard to simply abandon one's identity»⁴⁸. As a result, abandoning an ideological belief may be difficult. It entails giving up activities, habits, or places that are part of one's community. These beliefs can be neutral, such as ones about one's attachment to one's family. They can, however, be detrimental to society if they are used to explain the existence of inequality in a community.

When it comes to autonomy, propaganda and flawed ideologies can justify disparities and unequal distribution of opportunity con-

47 *Ibidem*, p.160.

48 *Ibidem*, p.206.

ditions in a given society. Or propaganda contributes to a lack of equal opportunity conditions, and hence does not develop autonomy as self-determination. Not only that, but propaganda in contemporary society is linked to internalized forms of oppression, influencing agents' self-authorization. As a matter of fact «a flawed ideology could prevent them [oppressed agents] from recognizing their own oppression, or, with less commitment, prevent them from acting so as to alleviate their oppression»⁴⁹. Specifically, this process is affected by the so-called propaganda model, that is an explanation of «how government restrictions on the media and private industry and oligarchic control of the media interact together to present selectively controlled information»⁵⁰.

Considering the relationship between autonomy propaganda, agents cannot be autonomous if they live in a propagandistic society according to the three conditions for relational autonomy. First, they cut off the possibility of genuine deliberation and are undermined in the development of their deeper concerns. Therefore, they hinder self-governing abilities. Additionally propaganda justifies an unequal distribution of opportunity and is, accordingly, hindering the possibility for all agents to exercise autonomy in terms of self-determination. Moreover, propaganda is used in contemporary societies from one group over other. Accordingly, it erodes autonomy as self-authorization for groups, as minorities, that are the target of such propaganda. Including propaganda in the analysis depended on the emphasis placed from Stanley on the relationship between propaganda and the US political system and, in general, contemporary liberal society.

AUTONOMY AND EDUCATION

Compulsory Miseducation is a book written by Paul Goodman in 1964. It analyzes the American public school system. The main assumptions guiding Goodman's analysis is that «schools less and less represent any human

49 *Ibidem*, p.247.

50 *Ibidem*, pp.256-257.

values, but [are] simply adjustment to a mechanical system»⁵¹.

Before I begin the analysis, I'd like to clarify two points. First, Paul Goodman does not feel that education is inherently useless. There is a distinction between education and schooling, the latter being the strict institutionalization of education through, for example, standardized programs or curriculum. He notices how «inevitably, expanding and aggrandizing, becoming the universal trainer, baby-sitter and fix-it, the schools are losing the beautiful academic and community functions that by nature they do have»⁵². Indeed, this chapter include some of Goodman's suggestions for an alternative concept of education.

Second, while Goodman focuses on the American school system, his research is nevertheless relevant in addressing education precluding from its national characteristics.

In the very first pages of his book, Goodman notices how education has lost its purpose to create citizens able to make constitutional innovations, or to produce useful goods for the country. Instead, scholars are *consumers*. Defining scholars as consumers, might seem dramatic; however, schools have progressively lost their characteristic purpose and have progressively become «a gigantic market for textbook manufactures, building contractors and graduate school of education»⁵³. Not only that, the situation in 2022 has changed due to the role social media have in shaping consumer's needs. To me, is particularly significant how even influencers, or internet figure have their school line, or school related content that they can monetize. So-called "back to school content" or school supplies lines provided from internet personas demonstrate how scholars are seen as a fruitful market that needs to be exploited.

Additionally, schooling, like work, was essentially designed to prepare learners to become cogs in this cultural machine. Teachers had become "personnel

51 P. Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation*, London, 1964, p.11.

52 *Ibidem*, p.6.

53 *Ibidem*, p.10.

in a school system, rather than contributing to the growing up of the young". And education served to hold the young "on ice": keep them busy before they entered the world of work and given them the illusion of belonging⁵⁴.

Furthermore, Goodman notices how another specific feature of contemporary schooling is the focus on grades. Such focus is related to the fact that «programmed instruction has so far concentrated almost exclusively on teaching mere concepts and information, rather than complex wholesome of learning»⁵⁵. As a result, school no longer represents a place for personal development and socializing. As evidenced by the size of classrooms and the standardized nature of programs. Indeed, being determined by a central government, school programs promote uniformity and standardization. However, this is problematic for autonomy because, as Stanley argues «those who are raised in communities with a uniform ideology will identify with that ideology»⁵⁶. If the ideology promoted fosters inequality – as was shown to be the case of meritocracy – agents in subordinate positions according to that ideology will identify in a group that has fewer opportunity conditions. For instance, in his book *Black Boy*, Richard Wright argues that «the education system and the media are permeated with the myth of Black inferiority, which is largely accepted by the negatively privileged population of southern Blacks. There are structural barriers to accessing alternative conceptualizations»⁵⁷.

Goodman carries on by analyzing how the basis for compulsory education appears to be based on society's need for technically competent employees. However, he considers the example of General Motors' employers and notices how such a career requires only three weeks of training for people with no specific degree. This trend also applies

54 R. Kinna, *The Government of No One. The Theory and Practice of Anarchism*, cit., p.67

55 P. Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation*, cit., p.38.

56 J. Stanley, *How Propaganda Works*, cit., p.245.

57 *Ibidem*, p.255.

to positions that require complex abilities, such as those in the Army or Navy. They are, in fact, thought to those who did not obtain specific education in a year. Additionally, «if diplomas are prerequisite to hiring a youngster, the correlation of schooling and employment is self-proving»⁵⁸. Besides, education is seen as a propaedeutic choice to allow a broader array of self-determining choices in the future (ex. work or career opportunities). However, job opportunities and the kind of education one has received do not overlap completely. Since

education levels are very important in determining salary levels, but if this were simply a matter of training and education, the American higher education system would hardly be in the state that it is, with thousands of exquisitely trained PhDs subsisting on adjunct teaching jobs that leave them well below the poverty line – even dependent on food stamps⁵⁹.

Before proceeding with the analysis of the relationship between relational autonomy and education, I recall some arguments from the last chapter to illustrate the potentially problematic role of schools. According to Stanley, schools can be defined as a vehicle of propaganda. That is, they consist of the sites and mechanisms that produce and export propaganda. Indeed school «represents itself as providing all the relevant information for being an informed citizen, yet regularly withholds information for being an informed citizen»⁶⁰.

Furthermore, Stanley contends that schools are an asymmetrical environment in which teachers frequently communicate by directives. This, I believe suggest, can be problematic for a person's deeper concern. If professors deliver non-issue content in their lessons, the process that underlies the development of a scholar's deeper concern becomes tricky, especially if those not-at-issue content foster gender-based dynamics,

58 P. Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation*, cit., 1964 p.25.

59 D. Graeber, *Bullshit jobs: A Theory*, New York, 2018, p.220.

60 J. Stanley, *How Propaganda Works*, cit., 2018, p.75.

or they imply racist contents. Additionally, «the concern is that the education system as well as the news media will become an organ for the propagation of the ideology of the positively privileged group. [...] Control of what is taught in the public schools amounts to control of the basic political dialectic»⁶¹. This, as relational accounts show, can severely impact agents' self-worthiness in the political discourse.

On top of that, Goodman points at the fact that

the serious activity of youth is going to school and getting at least passing grades; all the rest – music, driving, ten billion annually of teenage commodities, dating, friendships, own reading, hobbies, need for one's money – all this is treated by the adults [ex. the educators] as frivolous⁶².

With the result that, students have to deal with Goodman identifies as *embarrassment*, or with «the inability to express or reveal one's need and feelings to the others»⁶³. When one considers the function that schooling plays in the development of the average child, one can see how important aspects of one's personality are omitted in an environment where one must spend so much time. This can result in an agent's incapacity to relate to their particular difficulties or specific needs. Or, schools are not developing the skills necessary to engage in a discourse about topics such as difficult family problems, traumas, or addictions. This specific feature not only undermines autonomy as self-authorization, but it also relates to the development of self-governing skills, specifically those required for verbal communication that allow a proper engagement in social relations.

Moreover, considering self-governance, since school programs involve a passive receiving of notions, standardized in uniformed programs, they do not take into account the kind of competencies such as imagination, empathy that relational theorists have indeed highlighted as crucial for the development of autonomy. Furthermore, this also relates to

61 *Ibidem*, p.252-253.

62 P. Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation*, cit., 1964, p.50.

63 *Ibidem*, p.31.

the problem of *asymmetrical relations*⁶⁴. Learning involves a mere reception of notions and students do not take an active part in the learning process. Thus, the preparation offered by educational systems is not relatable to autonomy competencies. In fact, students are not asked to, taught, or encouraged to exercise none of the abilities required, not even to *self-reflect* that is the pillar of authenticity conditions⁶⁵. Moreover, the teacher appears as authority and the content of lessons as command and can deliver not-at-issue content that are potentially harmful. This is problematic concerning the development of students' deeper concern and, once again, the relationship between agents' self-authorization and the value they assume they have (even politically) in a community. A possible solution would be to «encourage imagination rather than conditioned answers»⁶⁶, or to «encourage fantasy and guesswork. There is no point in learning the *answers*, for very soon there will be different answers. Rather, what must be taught are the underlying ideas of scientific thought, continuous with the youngster's feeling and experience»⁶⁷.

Furthermore, since school is mandatory and there are no valid alternatives to it, the choice is not autonomous. Goodman then proposes how there should be alternatives

64 They recall what stated in the previous paragraph. The problem is that authorities introduce not-at-issue content and in the form of imperatives. So, they possess «having a perfectly formally articulable effect on the context set, without representing that effect as adding a content» Ivi, p.160. Specifically, it relates to what Stanley calls as *subordinating speech* and to the fact that not-at-issue content can effectively «change epistemic preferences orderings» J. Stanley, *How Propaganda Works*, cit., p.161. This can seriously affect agents' ability to shape their own deeper concerns and recognize them. Furthermore, as above-mentioned, this mechanism of adding not-at-issue content undermines autonomy as self-authorization since it «place[s] the targeted group outside the second-personal framework of “mutual respect” that underlies the possibility of reasonableness» Ivi, p.168.

65 See M. Friedman, *Autonomy, Gender, Politics*, New York, 2003.

66 P. Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation*, cit., 1964, p.14.

67 *Ibidem*, p.21.

for young people consistently with a conception of autonomy as self-determination. «We should be experimenting with different kinds of school, no school at all, the real city as school (ex. the shops), farm schools, practical apprenticeships, guided travel, work camps, little theaters and local newspapers, community service»⁶⁸.

Finally, I would mention that contemporary meritocracy is not fostering autonomy as self-determination because it involves a strict distinction between groups. Specifically, it promotes a differentiation between people able who are to rule and those who are not based on the criteria of merit. This latter group remains in a subordinate position and has access to limited options in terms of self-determination. Meritocracy, however, do not take into consideration factors as economical difficulties, family situations, health problem and the access to adequate medical services or other criteria that deeply influence one's academical career. Education supports this through a distinction between theory and practical activities, or between «mere practical skill and the exercise of theoretical knowledge»⁶⁹. However, by quoting Antonio Gramsci, Stanley notices that «there is no naturalistic grounding for a division of society into intellectuals and others, only their *social function*, which is that of *organizing social hegemony and state of domination*»⁷⁰. To conclude this chapter, I would like to suggest that Herbert Read has given some fruitful suggestions on how to re-think education both in *Education through art* as well as in *To Hell with Culture*.

CONCLUSIONS

Relational autonomy stresses the role played by institutionalized - and not - practices and how they affect personal autonomy. I argue that anarchism, as well as Jason Stanley's work, provides strong argument

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p.60.

⁶⁹ J. Stanley, *How Propaganda Works*, cit., 2018, p.286.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p.288.

according to which contemporary society are not able to foster the three axes of multidimensional approach to autonomy. They also provide counter examples and ideas that could inspire new practices that are compatible with relational accounts. Accordingly, the article highlights how agents' autonomy can not merely hang on the luck of being born in proper relationships and to being member of a determined group instead of another. They require political and institutionalized circumstances that agents need to collectively shape. Moreover, this thesis highlighted that, according to relational theories, autonomy is a matter of *exercise*; this has a twofold meaning. On the one hand, autonomous agents should exercise their autonomy-related competencies. Consequently, relational accounts require specific relationships that allow this exercise. On the other hand, relational autonomy calls for agents to exercise their competencies to create autonomy-friendly relationships and environments. Thus, autonomy is not an all-or-nothing concept, or something that some agents possess since their achievement. Considering the concept State, I noticed how it is not compatible with any of the three axes. According to Bookchin's account, the State is an entity that represents an institutionalized attitude of domination that displays this characteristic even in its capitalistic arrangement. Through their party-structure and bureaucratic apparatus, states determine opportunity conditions agents have at their disposal. Additionally, considering that states represent institutionalized patterns of domination, their stance towards agents' self-governing skills (and the development of deeper concerns) is problematic. Moreover, I suggested that contemporary societies do not take into account autonomy as self-authorization. This latter feature is reduced as personality-matter, and it is not considered as constitutive for the development of autonomy. To this conception, I counterpose Bookchin's libertarian municipalism. Then, I argued that analyzing libertarian municipalism is valuable in a

twofold way. On the one hand, it represents a conception of social relationship that is compatible with relational autonomy. On the other hand, it points at a concrete alternative to state relationships. Specifically, after the pandemic, the economical effects of Russian invasion of Ukraine and the increase in economical differences between world population I argue that the paradigm of neo-liberalism is not capable of fostering relational autonomy. Specifically, due to its inability to deliver substantial equality and its focus on formal equality⁷¹ that does not promote an equal access to autonomous choices. For example the choice of working, rather than studying, or where to live. The latter, is going to be particularly important due to the effects of climate change and the implication on the access to resources.

After considering State, I focused on the implications of a relational account on the concept of *laws*. According to the account provided by Cossutta, laws are not compatible with relational autonomy because they represent a command of the authority *imposed* on a community: they establish opportunity conditions that are crucial for self-determination. I have also argued that such an account does not consider agents as self-governing and, additionally, it cuts their possibilities to display self-authorization. So, I presented the concept of *jurisprudence*, arguing that it is compatible with the three axes of a relational account. Or it assumes agents as self-governing, and it allows them to display self-authorization. Additionally, according to this conception, agents contribute to shaping their self-determining conditions. That is, jurisprudence is a socio-linguistic praxis in which agents participate when they are in need of solving a controversy, or they want to rule their community. It emerges from the dialectic between subjects and mirrors the value of a community. Thus, law

71 L. Barclay, "Autonomy and the Social Self" in: *Relational Autonomy Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self*, New York, 2000a. Or G. Mbiot, *How Did We Get into This Mess?*, New York, 2016.

and autonomy can be held together: law can indeed foster agents' relational autonomy through dialectical practices that recall the one of the trial.

Then, I analysed propaganda through Jason Stanley's work, and I argued that propaganda can not foster relational autonomy. For instance, by promoting a *managerial* culture, propaganda undermines the possibilities for relational autonomy for a group of agents. It is also, for instance, covering USA's essentially oligarchical structure. Additionally, propaganda has different influences on relational autonomy: it erodes some features of self-governance (ex. empathy and the skills to engage in a critical dialogue), it diminishes self-esteem, self-trust, and self-respect of specific categories of individuals. Accordingly, it promotes the existence of an unjust distribution of opportunities in a community.

Propaganda introduced the last facet of autonomy I considered, or education. As Paul Goodman has pointed out, the educational system is not fostering autonomy on several levels. For example, scholars are not able to develop self-governing skills. Specifically, I suggested that the relationship between agents and their deeper concerns is problematic. Additionally, educational systems do not recognize students' self-authorization and the fact that things such as *shame* deeply undermine agents' identity. Then, I mentioned that educational systems do not guarantee autonomy as self-determination due to their relationship with the job market.

Concluding, I suggest that anarchism represent a valid reference for relational autonomy scholars. Specifically, anarchism challenges contemporary societies and their structures, and it argues that they are opposing personal autonomy. Each chapter would require further research and should be investigated, this paper did not aim to provide a complete account of the relationship between relational autonomy and state, law, propaganda and education. Rather, it tried to point at the incompatibilities between con-

temporary societies and relational autonomy while, at same time time, exploring possible alternatives.

Lisa Bin, ex alumna of Ghislieri College, holds a master's degree in philosophy from the University of Pavia. Previously, she received her bachelor's degree in philosophy from the University of Trieste. Now, she collaborates with HSU-Hamburg. His research interests are philosophy of law and political philosophy, with a focus on "social" conceptions of law (social legal theories) and, among others, anarchism.

Lisa Bin, ex allieva del Collegio Ghislieri, è laureata magistrale in filosofia presso l'Università degli Studi di Pavia. Precedentemente ha conseguito il titolo triennale di dottore in filosofia presso l'Università degli studi di Trieste. Ora, collabora con l'HSU-Hamburg. I suoi interessi di ricerca sono filosofia del diritto e filosofia politica, con particolare attenzione a concezioni "sociali" del diritto (social legal theories) e, tra le altre cose, all'anarchismo.

lisabin96@gmail.com