

# IDENTITY AT THE CROSSROADS: JAPAN'S ROLE IN REGIONAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN EAST ASIA

Hana Umezawa

*Visiting Professor, Jagiellonian University in Krakow*

[hana.umezawa@googlemail.com](mailto:hana.umezawa@googlemail.com)

**Abstract:** The objective of this paper is to analyse the 'sui generis' identity of Japan in the context of the East Asian Region and to demonstrate how it contributed to shape the country's role in East Asia's region-building. Japan's position in the region has been complex due to its unique identity generated by historical background, geopolitical factors, economic development and relations with its Western allies. This identity facilitated Japan's objective to build a cohesive regional community through the promotion of 'open regionalism' and the country's active participation in regional and interregional fora including ASEAN. Following the introduction, the article provides an overview of Japan's multifaceted identity in its diplomacy and how the country has utilised different elements of its identity in varying historical and political circumstances. By looking into official discourse from the vantage point of its identity, it then examines Japan's cooperation with regional actors, highlighting its active involvement without assuming a leading role. The last section concludes the article, summarizes the findings and provides a short outlook.

**Keywords:** East Asia; Japan; socio-cultural identity; geopolitics; history

## 1. Introduction

The paper examines Japan's perception of the East and Southeast Asian region and its attempts to engage with it. It views the role of Japan in its regional cooperation in Asia through the lens of identity. It reconceptualises Japanese foreign policy as a set of discursive practices that attempt to produce renewed images of Japan's national self in Asia through the analysis of the official discourse. When seen in its historical context, the fact that Japan has long suffered from an identity crisis in the region is unsurprising. The paper argues that Japan's ambiguous identity necessitated cautious approaches in its support of community building in Asia without claiming the leadership role. The use of language is relevant, since concepts of identity and region are intersubjective processes rather than a given objective fact. The analysis will focus on Japan's engagement in Asia by highlighting how the country's identity based on the historical and geopolitical background has formed its evolving policy towards the region throughout the post World War II period. Special attention is paid to its cooperation with ASEAN, as the central organisation in regional community building. As ASEAN-Japan cooperation celebrated its Golden Jubilee in 2023. However, it is timely to take stock of the current circumstances as well as the path it has come so far. The post-

war Japan has been a key player in supporting Southeast Asia economically and institutionally over the past few decades. By substantially investing in Southeast Asia and strongly supporting “ASEAN centrality” (hub of East Asian multilateralism), Japan has empowered the ASEAN states to diversify economically and diplomatically, and safeguard their autonomy as a regional community. The role played by Japan was not that of an active leader in the region. Instead, it called for building equal partnerships with Southeast Asia.

Firstly, the paper seeks to conceptualize Japan’s identity in its diplomacy based on its historical background. Secondly, the article analyses Japan’s cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In doing so, it examines how Japan has cautiously supported regional community building without claiming the leadership role, attributing it to Japan’s identity. Finally, the concluding remarks summarize the findings and provide a cursory outlook.

## *2. Japan’s identity: Westernism, Asianism, and Internationalism*

Identity is conceptualised here as an intersubjective category that defines ‘who you are’ (the self) in relation to “who you are not” (the ‘other’) in a given context. Put it differently, the relational and reflexive nature of identity embraces the logic of difference and creates social space between self and other. It highlights properties of the ‘self’ that generate self-respect and pride and distinguish it from the ‘other’. For example, a nationalist identity denotes specific political, economic, historical, social, cultural, normative, religious, ethnic or linguistic properties that the citizens of a nation reclaim for themselves and that at the same time distinguish them from the members of another nation.

Moreover, identity is of a subjective nature. This means that the process of identity construction does not rely on objective facts. Instead, it is the process of how individual actors define the reality. Identity is determined by how each actor defines the relationship between self and others. The nature of identity as a subjective and intersubjective process makes it difficult to analyse it in an objective manner (Campbell 2007). This is the main reason why the analysis of the official discourse seems to be the most suitable method for analysing identity.

Lastly, identity is a process rather than an outcome. This means that a given identity does not persist universally and permanently for a particular group. Identity is highly contingent, constantly being defined and redefined and thus prone to change.

A brief overview of Japanese diplomacy since the Meiji Restoration (1868) allows us to identify three identity discourses. They can be derived from the official narrative in different historical periods (Oga, 2003; Hosoya, 2023) and include Westernism, Asianism, and Internationalism. Yet all three discourses cannot be clearly periodized because they are multiple discourses which have been intricately intertwined.

‘Westernism’ corresponds to the discourses of the Meiji era (1868-1912) as well as the early post-World War II period, when Japanese elites pursued an identity that characterized Japan as part of the Western world. The widely spread slogan of “*datsu-a nyu-o*” (“de-Asianisation and Westernisation” or “getting out of Asia and enter Europe”) in the early Meiji era reflected the prevailing sentiment of distancing itself from colonised rest of Asia in order to secure Japan’s survival, and strengthening the nation by promoting a Western-style nation state and emulate Western policies (Tankha, 2021). Similarly, Japanese foreign policies in the immediate aftermath of World War II were built around relations with the United States for the sake of its survival and reconstruction and remained so during much of the Cold War era (Inoue, 1998). Moreover, the discourse of Westernism, highlighting the significance of sharing Western values and norms, has been the very basis of Japan’s cooperation with Western powers and international organizations dominated by the West. With its emphasis on the significance of the US-Japan alliance as well as the cooperation with the liberal democracies in the context of the Cold War, the pro-American and pacifist 1951 ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ can be regarded as an example for an identity guided by ‘Westernism’.

‘Asianism’ dominated the discourse from the post-World War I period to the pre-World War II period, in the post-World War II period during the premiership of Takeo Fukuda as expressed in his Fukuda Doctrine, and more recently in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 and 1998. This discourse reflects a discontent with Westernisation. It represents the idea of promoting modernisation through the introduction of Western science and technology while at the same time maintaining the spiritual culture of Asia. The discourse emphasises a self-imposed leadership role as an obligation of Japan that due to its economic prowess must promote the region’s development (Yamamuro, 1998). The discourse of Asianism is clearly expressed in an “Asian diplomacy” (Iokibe 1999, Hatano, 1997). Some of the foreign policies of the 1980s with a stronger emphasis on Southeast Asia also fall into this category (Hatano 1997, Fuabashi 1993). Yet it was the Asian Financial Crisis that led Japan to place a higher priority on its Asian regional identity. Japan’s proposal to set up an Asian Monetary Fund during the Asian Financial Crisis is a case in point for this shift towards an Asianist identity.

‘Internationalism’ seeks to reconcile the discourses of ‘Westernism’ and ‘Asianism’. It emphasises Japan’s role as an intermediary between Europe, the US and Asia. This discourse figured prominently in the official narratives since the latter half of Meiji era (1868-1912) to the early period of the post-World War I era, as well as in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The discourse of internationalism emphasises the significance of Japan’s contribution to the international community rather than specifying regions as identity building. Japanese diplomatic documents during the 1990s frequently regarded the

international community as a reference object, rather than Asia or the West. Also the concept of 'open regionalism' promoted by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the 1990s can be seen as an expression of 'internationalism'. In the next section, it will be examined how the three identities and their underlying narratives that can be identified in modern Japan's diplomacy have been applied to changing historical and geopolitical contexts.

### *3. Japan's identity: historical context*

The quest of identity becomes vigorous when a country is faced with fundamental challenges. Indeed, Japan's continuous pursuit of its identity was initiated by its encounter with the West in the mid-nineteenth century since Commodore Matthew Perry's small American fleet of '*kurofune* (black ships)' sailed into Tokyo harbour demanding that Japan open up to western trade and diplomatic presence. Japan was forced to end its closed-door policy and accept unequal treaties with the US and European countries (Suzuki, 2005). The lengthy period of isolationist policy of *Sakoku* (1636-1853) had enabled Japan to maintain a certain distance from China as the regional cultural hub, but more importantly from the West, which helped Japan to maintain its independence while developing and preserving a unique culture. Although much medical knowledge had already been gained from a Dutch outpost in Nagasaki during the *Sakoku* period, the very sight of the gigantic 'black ships' served as a powerful reminder of the technological advances of the West. Japan thus set out to rapidly modernise itself without being coerced by the West (Hopkins, 2022).

The nineteenth century international order that Japan encountered was one characterised by European colonialism and the racial and cultural superiority of Europe. The then Japanese leaders thus regarded any attempt of resistance to the West to be too risky. As the most persuasive option was to modernise and to westernise Japan by emulating Western technologies, political and military institutions, and thoughts, Japanese leaders were receptive to Westernisation to a significant degree (Sam-Sang, 2011). In other words, Japan's fierce attempt to seek its identity as a member of the West at the time was driven by a desire not to be regarded as part of an inferior Asia by the then imperial Western powers (Kitaoka, 1999).

Following this rationale, Japanese elites believed that overseas military bases and an increasing sphere of influence would be necessary to defend Japan's territorial integrity in the midst of expansionist Western powers. It was this ideology that by and large characterised Japan's foreign policy during the imperial years. As Japan's power consolidated in the early twentieth century, it began to shed its identity shaped by Westernism and increasingly adopted an Asian identity. In the process, Japan saw itself as the country at the forefront of Asian modernity, rivalling the West and leading its neighbours in a greater Asia co-prosperity sphere of pan-Asianism. However, Japan's imperialistic ventures in the first half

of the twentieth century left a complex legacy. The atrocities committed by its military during this period have significantly influenced its post-war identity, characterised by pacifist policies and the priority of economic development over military strength.

After the largely Westernist outlook of the Yoshida Doctrine in the early 1950s, Japan's very first Diplomatic Bluebook, published in 1957, identified three guiding principles of post-war Japanese foreign policy: (1) UN-centred diplomacy; (2) policy based on the membership in the Asian community; and (3) maintenance of cooperation with the free world (MOFA 1957). It was based on an internationalist identity that subsumed Asianism and Westernism. The first principle implied a commitment to the international norms upheld by the United Nations, including those enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The second principle called for the building of strong regional ties, transcending animosities rooted in the policies of the Imperial Japan. The third principle meant solidarity with the United States, as well as the rest of the Western Bloc in the context of the Cold War.

The apparent willingness of Japan to act as a bridge between the West and Asia had already become evident in the address of then Foreign Minister Shigemitsu at the United Nations General Assembly on the occasion of Japan's Admission to the UN in 1956: "The people of Japan today desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships. We have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world [...]. The substance of Japan's political, economic and cultural life is the product of the fusion within the last century of the civilizations of the Orient and the Occident. In a way, Japan may well be regarded as a bridge between the East and the West. She is fully conscious of the great responsibilities of such a position" (MOFA, 1956).

The above narrative is the reflection of Japan's attempt to address the dilemma of its identity discussed in the previous section. Moreover, Shigemitsu, as an advocate of Asianism, was acutely aware of the need to reconcile Japan's past and the future status in Asia: a nation striving to be seen as a partner for development, contrasting with the painful memories of its past. And, indeed, Japan's massive trade and investment in Southeast Asia and, to a lesser degree in other parts of Asia, have made the country the driving force for regional economic growth and integration in Pacific Asia, hence increasing its political leverage and influence in the region (Hatch and Yamamura 1996).

After the predominance of an identity shaped by Westernism in the 1960s and 1970s, Japan returned to an internationalist identity after the end of the Cold War. As the erstwhile frontlines of the Cold War increasingly blurred, a diplomacy based only on a Westernist identity was no longer practical. The Gulf War of 1990 represented a "rude awakening" to the realities of the post-Cold War world. Such narratives have become even more dominant after the Gulf War of 1990, due to

Japan's "failure" to make a more substantial "international contribution (kokusai koken)" to the UN-mandated multilateral forces (Oyama 2015; Nakayama 1992). This holds particularly true for the post-Cold War attempts to build a new international order based on institutions. The proliferation of new regional and interregional fora and the deepening of existing ones such as ASEAN, was a global trend of which East and Southeast Asia were a prominent part. The revived internationalist identity thus became a major element in Japan's promotion of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region.

It was in this context that Japan advocated the term 'open regionalism' in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), referring to the inclusive, flexible, informal and pragmatic form of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region that differs markedly from the highly institutionalized and legalistic European type of integration. Open regionalism is a concept that has played a vital role in Japan's regional and foreign policy to date. The concept is inclusive and comprehensive by nature, both in terms of the membership and issue areas to be dealt with. In other words, Asian regionalism and global principles complement with each other in the concept of open regionalism. It highlights the willingness to play a bridging role between the West and Asia, rather than attempting to play a proactive leadership role in regional community building. There are several factors underlining Tokyo's cautious approach towards the region.

Firstly, there is some ambiguity regarding Japan's regional identity both domestically and internationally. While Japan is an Asian country in a geographical sense, it is at the same time an industrial democracy that worships universal values. Its position in the region is therefore ambiguous in its own view and neighbouring countries (Huntington 1993). It could be argued that such policy mirrors Japan's confusion regarding its identity, thus portraying its relationship with other Asian nations in the context of 'Japan and Asia', rather than 'Japan in Asia'.

Secondly, the concept of Asian regionalism can be controversial for many countries in the region and the Japanese citizens alike. It reminds of Japan's futile attempt to establish a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' (GEACPS) during World War II that still stirs unpleasant memories. The latter called for an autarkic bloc of East Asian nations under the leadership of Japan for the collective cause of regional defence against the West (Mimura 2011). Although the alleged goal of the GEACPS was to free Asia from colonising Western powers and Japanese regional leadership was claimed to be temporary, Japan's militarist government utilised it as a way to gain access to resources through exploitation to maintain its position in the region as a modern great power. While there is no longer a consistent or unified Asian stance against Japan, the historical legacy has prevented Japan from actively seeking an exclusive Asian regionalism.

Thirdly, Japan's close relationship with the US inevitably means that an exclusive form of Asian regionalism would not fit its foreign policy. For Japan,

the US-Japan alliance was more a political rather than a strategic choice. The end of the Cold War therefore did not lead to the termination of the security treaty concluded in 1960, despite that its prime objective was to defend Japan from the communist threat had largely vanished. The National Defence Programme Outline in 1995 reaffirmed the centrality of the US-Japan Security Treaty to Japan's security policy (Sakanaka 1997; Muroyama 1997). Moreover, the Japanese economy also heavily depends on the US market. The bilateral relationship with the US has thus been the centrepiece of Japan's foreign and trade policies and remained a constraint for an exclusive East Asian regionalism. Vice versa, Japan would also not proactively promote a region-wide project including the US as an active participant, when it is likely to be met by resistance from countries in the region due to their concern over China's reaction. For instance, the broadening of the US-Japan alliance from narrowly defined Japanese security to cover the security in Asia-Pacific region was only possible with a prior assurance that such a redefinition would be acceptable to most regional countries (Sato 2003). Such balancing efforts have been required for Japan when it comes to its foreign policy in the region, which will be examined in the following section.

#### *4. Japan and ASEAN*

The 50th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Japan Friendship and the Cooperation Commemorative Summit held in Tokyo in December 2023 included a session on the topic of "Partners in Co-Creating the Future Economy and Society". Prime Minister Kishida stated that "the keyword for future ASEAN-Japan cooperation in the economic and social fields is "co-creation (kyo-so)" and emphasised that "it is important for ASEAN and Japan to work together to find solutions to the challenges our economies and societies face, based on the mutual trust" established through "the history we have walked together" (MOFA 2023).

The following sections will trace the evolution of the Japan-ASEAN relationship. It began with Japan's offer in the 1950s to provide "a helping hand" as part of post-war reconstruction measures to "partners co-creating the economy and society of the future". The analysis draws from speeches of Japanese government representatives and official documents issued at high-level ASEAN-Japan meetings from the early days of the relation up to the 50th anniversary Commemorative Summit. The analysis demonstrates that Japan's identity in its East Asian policy has gradually shifted from that of Westernism to Asianism, and more recently to include narratives of internationalism, while upholding ASEAN's autonomy and centrality in the regional community building.

##### *4.1. Japan's post-war identity*

Japan's early twentieth century imperialism, climaxing in the attempt to establish a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' (GEACPS), greatly impacted the country's identity and had far-reaching consequences for its relations to other

Asian countries in the post-World War II period. The atrocities and war crimes committed during the imperialist period and the shocks caused by the disastrous nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ending the Pacific War led to a complete identity change. The militarism of the pre-war period gave way to pacifist policies and a focus on economic development in an attempt to acquiesce the countries it had colonized before. Japan's rapid economic recovery combined with the post-war international environment facilitated a shift from an identity shaped by Asianism to an identity with strong traits of Westernism.

Yet, in the second half of the 1950s, this Westernism was increasingly substituted by an internationalist identity as the Foreign Minister Shigemitsu's speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 1956 showed, in which he characterised Japan as "a bridge" between the West and Asia. This change of identity toward "Internationalism" was corroborated by Japan's very first Diplomatic Bluebook which, published in 1957, sought to reconcile Internationalism, Asianism, and Westernism.

Balancing the above mentioned three principles was not always easy for Japan, not only as an ally of the West in the Cold War but also as a former aggressor from within the region. Nevertheless, the need to reconcile Japan's past and the future status in Asia was firmly recognised in the official narratives. Japan has therefore consolidated its identity as a bridge between the West and Asia by introducing a more 'open' (i.e. international) approach to its regional policies. The establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) under Japanese stewardship in December 1966 was a case in point. Leaning towards an internationalist identity was regarded as desirable for Japan in order to prevent the escalation of the Cold War in Asia when a large part of the region was under communist rule. In this regard, the diplomatic discourse during this period did not regard Asia as an object of Japan's identity, but rather as an object for interest formation by strengthening ties with the region under its identity as a member of 'the free world'.

### *5. The gradual rise of Asianism*

Following the establishment of the ADB, Japan initiated the Southeast Asian Development Ministerial Conference in April 1966 with the aim of promoting regional cooperation for the economic development of Southeast Asian countries. This conference became one of the catalysts for the establishment of ASEAN in the following year (Araki 2014).

As Japan provided development aid to Southeast Asian countries since the early 1950s, economic relations with the region flourished. For example, in 1972, the trade dependency of all ASEAN countries on Japan was 21.8 percent, making Japan the largest trading partner for all ASEAN countries except for Singapore. Furthermore, not only dominated Japanese products in ASEAN member states, but Japanese investment and the entry of Japanese companies into ASEAN

countries also increased rapidly from the 1970s onward. However, ASEAN countries perceived this expansion of Japanese influence as asymmetric and as an over-presence, which evoked images of Japan's successful realisation of its pre-war project of the East Asian Coprosperity Sphere without utilising military means (Hook 2000).

In light of this situation, in January 1974, Prime Minister Tanaka visited the five ASEAN founding members in an attempt to ease anti-Japanese sentiment and economic friction (Atarashi 1994). During his visit Tanaka outlined five principles on which ASEAN-Japan relations should rest: 1) promoting good neighbourly relations with the countries of Southeast Asia in which both sides share peace and prosperity; 2) respecting the autonomy of these countries; 3) promoting mutual understanding; 4) contributing to ASEAN's development while refraining from threatening their economic independence; and 5) respecting the regional cooperation that these countries independently practice (MOFA 1974).

The first turning point came during the Fukuda administration, when Prime Minister Fukuda toured Southeast Asia to strengthen ties with ASEAN, a response to the profound geopolitical changes in the region after the Vietnamese victory in the second Vietnam War and the withdrawal of US ground troops from mainland Southeast Asia (Tanaka 1999). At the first Japan-ASEAN summit held in August 1977, the prime minister acknowledged that ASEAN had established itself as a regional organisation and declared that “[t]he Japanese government and the people of Japan will never be skeptical bystanders of ASEAN's efforts to strengthen solidarity and resilience, but will instead be good partners walking alongside ASEAN”. He delivered a speech entitled “Japan's Policy towards Southeast Asia” in which he enunciated three principles later referred as Fukuda Doctrine: (1) Japan is committed to peace, and rejects the role of a military power; (2) Japan will do its best to consolidate the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on ‘heart-to-heart’ understanding with the nations of Southeast Asia; and (3) Japan will cooperate positively with ASEAN while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding and equal partnership (MOFA 1978). He further stated in the same speech that: “[i]t is not enough for our relationship to be based solely on mutual material and economic benefit. Our material and economic relations should be animated by heartfelt commitments to assisting and complementing each other as fellow Asians. This is the message I have carried everywhere on this tour, speaking repeatedly of the need to communicate with each other with our hearts as well as our heads, the need in other words for what I call “heart-to-heart” understanding among the peoples of Japan and Southeast Asia. You, fellow Asians, will understand what I mean. For it is in our Asian tradition, and it is in our Asian hearts, always to seek beyond mere physical satisfaction for the richness of spiritual fulfillment (MOFA 1978)”. The discourse to be highlighted in this context is where Fukuda recognised both Japan and Southeast Asian nations as “fellow Asians” which signifies his desire to promote

an equal relationship with ASEAN nations based on the sense of solidarity. His emphasis on the “the richness of spiritual fulfillment” as Asian tradition that is “our Asian hearts” can be understood as an attempt to differentiate Japan’s approach from that of the West. This narrative was a significant shift from the previous discourse of Japan’s identity as a liberal and anti-communist member of the Western bloc, indicating the rise of Asianism in its foreign policy. The Japan-ASEAN summit meeting was launched in the same year, making Japan ASEAN’s the first dialogue partner. In the Diplomatic Bluebook, the Fukuda Doctrine was described as “the first proactive diplomatic stance Japan has taken since the end of the World War II” (MOFA 1978). Fukuda Doctrine has become the basic principle of Japan’s ASEAN diplomacy, as well as Prime Minister Ohira’s concept on Pacific Rim cooperation (Kikuchi 2007) discussed below.

#### *5.1 Promotion of internationalism in Asia: open regionalism*

In December 1987, Prime Minister Takeshita attended the Japan-ASEAN Summit. In his opening speech at the conference entitled “Japan and ASEAN”, he emphasised that Japan-ASEAN relations should not be exclusive in the time of globalisation, by stating: “...our goal is to maintain and develop a relationship between Japan and ASEAN that is open to the world and contributes to the world. We are closely linked geographically and historically, and can be considered ‘natural allies’. However, in today’s world, where interdependence is growing not only in the Asia-Pacific region but on a global scale, I believe that our relationship should never be exclusive, and that we should work together to contribute to world peace and prosperity.” (MOFA 1987).

This is the beginning of the rise of Internationalism in Japan’s policy towards Asia. Internationalism is embodied in the concept of ‘open regionalism’ that was advocated by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an economic forum established in 1989 on the initiative of Japan and Australia. Open regionalism is inclusive, flexible, informal and pragmatic. It is open to the participants from within and beyond the region and, in particular, does not exclude the US as a key player in the region (Das 2001). Its origin dates back as far as 1979, when the then Prime Minister Ohira presented a report on Pacific Rim cooperation, stating that “a regionalism that is open to the world, not one that is exclusive and closed is the first characteristic of our concept. We are fully aware that a regional community without a perspective for a global community, a regionalism that excludes globalism, has no possibility of development and prosperity. Nonetheless, not a few problems that confront us today could be most suitably handled by first attempting regional co-operation and the developing this into global co-operation (Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group 1981: 184, cited in Ravenhill 2001: 54)”. Although Ohira’s proposal of a Pacific Rim Solidarity Initiative was not further promoted, the concept of “open regionalism” was carried over to APEC. In terms of the participating countries, all the countries envisaged to participate in the Pacific Rim Solidarity Initiative (12 countries

including Japan, Korea, ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) became APEC founding members.

Open regionalism is a concept that has played a vital role in Japan's regional and foreign policy to date. The government statements quoted above seek to reconcile the concept open regionalism, on the one hand, and exclusive Asian regionalism and full-fledged globalism, on the other. Asian regionalism and global principles have been considered to complement with each other in Japan's concept of open regionalism, and more recently, that of the Free and Open Indo Pacific (FOIP) based on its "open" approach to the region (Tan 2020). Establishing an identity based on "open regionalism" was one of the major goals of Japanese diplomacy throughout the 1990s.

Japan's APEC initiative based on "open regionalism" was the reflection of its special attention to ASEAN countries' interests, as indicated by Takeshita's statement quoted above. In the 1990s, Japan-ASEAN relations became more comprehensive, due to the rapid expansion of Japan's investment in the region and the participation of Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in September 1992 which was fully supported by ASEAN countries (Shoji, 2009). On the political front, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the very first region-wide security forum was launched in 1994, following the proposal of Japan's Foreign Minister Mr. Nakayama at the 1991 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (Ashizawa 2013). It was against this background of increased regional confidence and cooperation that Japan viewed with special interest the idea proposed by Singapore in 1994 to hold a summit meeting between Asia and Europe. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was launched in March 1996 to promote cooperation in trade and investment between Asia and Europe, which has given a unique opportunity to further promote its bridging approach more proactively (Togo 2015).

#### *6. The Asian Financial Crisis and Japan's identity building in East Asia: placing Asia in the international contexts*

Starting in July 1997, Thailand and other Asian countries fell victim to a rapid currency depreciation and subsequent profound financial crisis. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia were the most affected countries, all experiencing a massive contraction of their economies. In response to this crisis, Prime Minister Hashimoto announced his intention to strengthen economic cooperation at the Japan-ASEAN Summit in December 1997. Moreover, in the following year, Finance Minister Miyazawa announced the New Miyazawa Initiative, which included financial assistance totalling US\$30 billion. Countries hit by the crisis greatly appreciated the initiative, which paved the way to Japan's Chiang Mai Initiative, a mechanism for mutual lending of foreign currency in times of financial turbulence (Shimizu 2023). The Asian Financial Crisis compelled Japan to become deeper involved in East Asian regionalism, despite its initial

ambiguous attitude (Gilpin 2000). The 1997 crisis has thus been regarded as the beginning of Japan's participation in East Asian regionalism.

In January 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi delivered a speech entitled "Japan and ASEAN in East Asia", later referred to as the "Koizumi Doctrine". The prime minister pointed out that "a quarter century has passed since the Fukuda Speech, and the international environment has changed dramatically". In response, he highlighted the need to build a "community that walks together and advances together" through "expanding East Asian regional cooperation based on Japan-ASEAN relations". He also emphasised the need to move beyond economic and developmental cooperation and address "transnational issues such as terrorism, piracy, energy security, infectious diseases, the environment, drugs, and human smuggling". Moreover, he asserted that "Japan-ASEAN cooperation should be expanded to a greater global scale" (Kantei 2002). Japan and ASEAN leaders thus further enhanced their relationship and declared in 2003 at their Special Summit in Tokyo that they would seek to build an 'East Asian Community' (ASEAN 2003).

While the AFC has marked the rise of more Asianism approach in Japanese foreign policies, it should be noted that Japan has always sought to balance its new East Asian policies with Westernist and Internationalist ideas. Key in this respect was the country's alliance with the US as "the cornerstone" of Japanese diplomacy, including that in Asia (MOFA 2009). This has necessitated Japan to ascertain the US's support regarding its participation in various regional fora established throughout this period of time. Japan has pursued a multilateral approach in its effort to address the common challenges, through its participation in East Asian frameworks, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN+3, as well as more "open" fora such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), while ensuring the US's support towards these regional and interregional initiatives. This was also due to the fact that Japan was acutely aware that the success of its regional initiatives depended on the acquiescence of the US due to its strong bilateral relationship with Washington as a centrepiece of its regional policy. Thus Japan's approach toward East Asian regionalism is largely subordinate to the management of alliance relations with the US (Zhang 2014). For instance, Japan's lack of support towards Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir's proposal of the establishment of the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) (later the East Asia Economic Council (EAEC)) was due to US concerns to be excluded. Moreover, Japan's attempt to include the US in the East Asia Summit established in 2005 by claiming the significance of "open regionalism" is another reflection of such an approach (Hoshino, 2011).

Prime Minister Hatoyama's proposal in 2009 for the creation of an "East Asian Community" has, too, provoked considerable concerns in the US as to whether it meant a shift of Japanese foreign policy to focus on East Asia rather than the US

(Takahata 2009). Subsequently Hatoyama, indirectly responding to Singapore's concern about its seemingly exclusive nature, emphasised in his speech that the vision of East Asian Community would be based on the principle of "open regionalism", thus indicating that the US does have a role to play in it (Kantei 2009).

### *7. Strengthening Internationalism: bridging the region and beyond*

Given the changes of the strategic environment in the region combined with ASEAN's rapid economic growth, ASEAN's presence and role in the region have increased markedly. China's growth and its demonstrated assertiveness in the South China Sea have caused concerns throughout ASEAN and beyond. Japan had also been locked in a tense standoff with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. This has led ASEAN and Japan to reorient their foreign policy priorities and redefine their relationship with each other. On the one hand, China's economic ties with most of the ASEAN member states have surged over the years to match or even overtake Japan's. Chinese influence throughout the region has increased dramatically on various fronts, which have been perceived as potential threats by ASEAN states not only to their economic integration process but also to the region's stability.

Having chosen three Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia) for his first overseas visit of his premiership, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's speech entitled as "The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy", that sought to strengthen Tokyo's ties with "maritime Asia", is one of the most vital objectives for Japan as a country that "depends on the seas for its safety and prosperity". It was further recognised in this context that "Japan's relationship that goes side by side with ASEAN is a supremely vital linchpin in terms of its importance to our diplomatic strategy" (MOFA 2013). This statement was the response to the changes of strategic environment in the region and ASEAN's economic growth, which has further increased ASEAN's actorness in the region. This was the further confirmation of Japan's awareness of the need to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN in a comprehensive manner, that had been signified in Koizumi Doctrine in 2002. The cooperative efforts to be made would include non-economic issues, such as security and political affairs. This was also in line with the shared interest with the US as well, whose focus gradually shifting towards Southeast Asia from the Middle East.

Japan's ASEAN Diplomacy under Abe found its expression in the following "Five Principles": 1) protection of freedom of thought, expression, and speech in Southeast Asia; 2) ensuring free and open ocean governed by laws and rules, not by might, welcoming the US rebalancing to Asia; 3) pursuing free, open, interconnected economies between Japan and ASEAN through enhanced flows of trade and investment, people, and goods; 4) enhancement of intercultural ties among the peoples of Japan and ASEAN; and 5) promotion of exchange among

the younger generations who will carry our nations into the future (MOFA 2013). The emphasis on the universal values as the first item highlighted a stark contrast with the Fukuda doctrine, in which Japan avoided taking an ideological or interventionist approach in Southeast Asia. This was the reflection of his “value-oriented diplomacy” announced earlier this year, that focused on “strengthening cooperation with countries that share the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law; building an open and innovative Asia; and contributing to world peace and stability” (Usami et al. 2007).

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” introduced as a diplomatic initiative for the Indo-Pacific region in 2016 was also part of a “value-based diplomacy”, with its emphasis on “universal values” (MOFA 2017). The essence of the idea of FOIP is to build a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region and to establish principles such as free trade, freedom of navigation, and the rule of law. Regarding ASEAN’s response to FOIP, the Chairman’s Statement of the Japan-ASEAN Summit in November 2017 stated that: “We noted that Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ reinforces the ASEAN-centered regional architecture”, while encouraging Japan to explore synergies with its various support programs for ASEAN to “build a well-connected, competitive and resilient ASEAN and Indo-Pacific region” (ASEAN 2017). Nevertheless, concerns regarding FOIP’s potentially negative effects upon ASEAN’s neutrality and centrality remained unresolved, especially due to the exclusion of China. In response to this, the Japanese government opted to use terms such as “concept” and “vision” since 2018 onwards, rather than “strategies” in the official documents regarding FOIP (Kamiya 2019), while ensured ASEAN’s centrality in FOIP. Consequently, the joint statement of the Japan-ASEAN Summit in November 2018 indicated ASEAN’s support to FOIP: “ASEAN leaders note with appreciation Japan’s intention to further contribute more proactively to securing regional and international peace, stability and prosperity, as well as Japan’s continued support for ASEAN connectivity, including through its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and its policy on a free and open Indo-Pacific, which reaffirms ASEAN’s vital role as the bridge connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the Indo-Pacific (ASEAN 2018).

ASEAN adopted its Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in June 2019, as its own Indo-Pacific policy framework. In addition to strengthening ASEAN centrality, the AOIP is based on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, rules-based frameworks, respect for sovereignty, non-interference, equality, mutual respect, mutual trust, and respect for international law, including the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and aims to promote cooperation in areas such as maritime cooperation, connectivity, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the economy. The AOIP, which upholds the principle of “inclusiveness,” is an Indo-Pacific concept that does not

exclude China (Ishikawa 2020). At the Japan-ASEAN Summit in November 2019, Prime Minister Abe expressed Japan's full support for the AOIP and his intention to pursue synergies between Japan's FOIP and the AOIP. In addition, the joint statement on the AOIP issued at the Japan-ASEAN Summit in November 2020 stated that AOIP and FOIP share essential principles related to promotion of peace and cooperation, and that the Japan-ASEAN strategic partnership will be further strengthened through cooperation in the AOIP's policy areas.

In December 2023, the 50th Anniversary of the ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation Commemorative Summit was held in Tokyo. Prime Minister Kishida emphasised in his speech that “[t]he core of Japan-ASEAN relations is, above all, mutual trust. And what underpins that trust is the weight of our history of consistently walking together, even in times of hardship” (MOFA 2023). Regarding the future of Japan-ASEAN relations, he stated his view that “[i]n an era of complex crises that are difficult for any single country alone to solve, Japan and ASEAN will bring together their respective strengths and find solutions based on a strong relationship of trust [...]. I hope that we will grow together as partners who ‘co-create’ society and the economy” (MOFA 2023).

The “Joint Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation” was adopted to outline concrete actions to develop Japan-ASEAN relations to a new stage for the next 50 years, building on the relationship of the past 50 years. The Vision Statement reaffirmed the shared vision of Japan and ASEAN, which is to “strengthen a meaningful, substantive and mutually beneficial comprehensive strategic partnership, respecting the unity and centrality of ASEAN” (ASEAN 2023). Following the Summit, Kishida stated at the parliament that “Japan will continue to respect the regional cooperation initiatives led by ASEAN, and will pursue proactive diplomacy toward promoting regional peace and stability through the enhancement of FOIP in cooperation with ASEAN countries”, highlighting the “open” and thus internationalist identity underlying Japan's cooperation with ASEAN.

## *8. Conclusion*

Japan has had difficulties in establishing itself as an authentic and effective member of an emerging Asian regional community for several reasons. While Japan has played a considerable role in supporting regional community building as a democracy and a leading economy in the region, this has not driven it to aim for a decisive leadership in the region. This has involved skilful diplomacy with the several major partners in the region, namely ASEAN, China, and the US.

Moreover, Japan has maintained a cooperative approach with ASEAN based on equal partnership and mutual trust built through the past 50 years of relationship.

Over half a century, Japan and ASEAN have overcome various challenges together and built a relationship of trust. They have come to a partnership through regional fora characterised by Japan's "open" approach to the region, sharing essential principles such as transparency and respect for international law. As the statements of high-ranking Japanese government representatives have shown, Japan's East Asian policy has gradually but steadily been developed to become more engaged based on its identity shift towards internationalism. For ASEAN countries, which have consistently placed importance on neutrality and its centrality in the region, the intensification of their relationship with Japan must be pursued in a way that it does not undermine their relationship to China. The analysis of the official narratives demonstrated that this was clearly recognised by Japanese officials.

There is a remaining concern regarding the application of the "value-based diplomacy" that former Prime Minister Abe promoted in Japan's relations to Southeast Asia. While the ASEAN Charter attaches significance to the fundamental values such as democracy and human rights, the diversity of the Association's member states regarding these values is not likely to change anytime soon. Although Japan is not willing to impose these values on ASEAN countries, focusing too much on "universal" values might provoke suspicions from many ASEAN member states as well as China. In this regard, Japan's evolving Internationalist identity with its "open" approach to the region and beyond, which recognises ASEAN's centrality in the community building in the region, seems to be appropriate for Tokyo in the years to come.

## *References*

ARAKI, M.

2014 *Nihon no ODA seisaku taiki no kako to genzai to mirai* (Japan's ODA policy: its past, present and future), *Kokusai mondai*, no.12.

ASEAN

2003 *Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the New Millennium* Available at: <https://asean.org/tokyo-declaration-for-the-dynamic-and-enduring-asean-japan-partnership-in-the-new-millennium/>.

2017 Chairman's Statement of the 20th ASEAN-Japan Summit, Available at: <https://asean.org/chairmans-statement-of-the-20th-asean-japan-summit/>.

2018 Joint Statement of the 21st ASEAN-Japan Summit to Commemorate the 45th Anniversary of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, Available at: <https://asean.org/speechandstatement/joint-statement-of-the-21st-asean-japan-summit-to-commemorate-the-45th-anniversary-of-asean-japan-friendship-and-cooperation/>.

- 2023 Joint Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation: Trusted Partners, Available at: <https://asean.org/joint-vision-statement-on-asean-japan-friendship-and-cooperation-trusted-partners-and-its-implementation-plan/>.
- ASHIZAWA, K.  
2013 Japan and the Creation of the ARF: MOFA in Motion, 1991–1994, in K. Ashizawa (ed.), *Japan, the US, and Regional Institution-Building in the New Asia, Japan, the US, and Regional Institution-Building in the New Asia*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 123-159.
- ATARASHI, K.  
1994 Japan's Economic Cooperation Policy towards the ASEAN Countries, *International Affairs*, 61 (1), 109-127.
- CAMPBELL, D.  
2007 Poststructuralism, in T. Dunne, M. Kurki, and S. Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 197-220.
- DAS, D.  
2001 Regionalism in a Globalizing World: An Asia-Pacific Perspective, *CSGR Working Paper No. 80/01*. Available at: <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/csgr/papers/workingpapers/2001/wp8001.pdf>.
- GILPIN, R.  
2000 *The Challenge of Global Capitalism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- HATANO, S.  
1997 Ajia Taiheiyō no “Chiki-shugi” to Nihon (Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific and Japan), in H. Kleinschmidt and S. Hatano (eds.), *Kokusai Chiki Togo no Hurontia*, Sairyusha, 175-208.
- HATCH, W., YAMAMURA, K.  
1996 *Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance*, Cambridge University Press.
- HOOKE, G. D.  
2000 Globalization, East Asian Regionalization, and Japan's Role in Euro-Asian Interregionalization, *Japan Review*, 12, 5-40.
- HOSHINO, M.  
2011 “Hirakareta chiki-shugi” to kantaiheiyō rentai koso (“Open Regionalism” and the Pacific Rim Solidarity Initiative), *Bulletin of Niigata Sangyo University*, 39, 27-43.
- HOPKINS, J. A.F.  
2022 Introduction: Asia and the West, J. A. F. Hopkins (ed.), *Japan as the Far West*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1-24.
- HOSOYA, Y.  
2023 Japan's bridging role between Asia and the West, R. Ward, Y., Koshino, M. Lebreton (eds.), *Japan and the IISS: Connecting Western and Japanese Strategic Thought from the Cold War to the War on Ukraine*, London, Routledge, 37-52.
- HUNTINGTON, S.  
1993 The clash of civilizations?, *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), 22-49.
- ISHIKAWA, K.  
2020 ASEAN no Indo Taiheiyō koso (AOIP): Motomerareru koso no gutaika to FOIP tonō renkei (ASEAN Indo-Pacific Initiative (AOIP): The realization of the vision and cooperation with

*Hana Umezawa / Identity at the Crossroads: Japan's Role  
in Regional Community Building in East Asia*

FOIP), *ITI Chosa Kenkyu shirizu*, no.101, Available at: <https://jaif.asean.org/whats-new/confirmation-of-cooperation-for-the-realization-of-free-and-open-indo-pacific-foip/>.

IOKIBE, M.

1999 *Sengo Nihon Gaiko-shi (Post-War Japanese Diplomatic History)*, Yuhikaku, 177-180

KANTEI (PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET)

2002 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, *Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership*, Available at: [https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech\\_e.html](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech_e.html).

2009 Address by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan Japan's New Commitment to Asia: Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community, Available at: [https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore\\_e.html](https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore_e.html).

KAMIYA, M.

2019 "Kyoso-senryaku" no tame no "kyoryoku-sennryaku": Nihon no "Jiyu de hirakareta indo Taiheiyo" senryaku (koso) no hukugoteki kozo ("Cooperative Strategy" for "Competitive Strategy": The Complex Structure of Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" Strategy (Concept)», *Anzenhoshō Kenkyū*, 1 (2), 47-64.

KIKUCHI, T.

2007 "Heart to Heart" Relations with ASEAN: The Fukuda Doctrine Revisited, *AJISS-Commentary*, Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Available at: [https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en\\_commentary/pdf/AJISS-Commentary20.pdf](https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/pdf/AJISS-Commentary20.pdf).

KITAOKA, S.

1999 Japan's identity and what it means», S. Kitaoka (ed.), *Japan's Identity: Neither the West Nor the East*, Japan Forum on International Relations, Available at: [https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/pdf/viewpoints\\_0011.pdf](https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/pdf/viewpoints_0011.pdf).

MOFA (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN)

1956 Address of his Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan, Before the United Nations General Assembly on the Occasion of Japan's Admission to the United Nations on December 18, 1956, Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/address5612.html>.

MOFA

1957 *Waga gaiko no kinkyō (Our recent Foreign Policies)*, Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1957/s32-contents.htm>.

1974 *Waga gaiko no kinkyō (Our recent Foreign Policies)*, Available at: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1974\\_1/s49-contents.htm](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1974_1/s49-contents.htm).

1978 *Waga gaiko no kinkyō (Our recent Foreign Policies)*, Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1978/s53-contents.htm>.

1987 Opening remarks by Prime Minister Takeshita at the Japan-ASEAN Summit: Japan and ASEAN: A New Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1987*, Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1987/s62-contents.htm>.

1988 *Diplomatic Bluebook 1988*, Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1988/s63-contents.htm>.

2009 *Diplomatic Bluebook 2009*, Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2009/html/index.html>.

2013 The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy (Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's policy speech, which was supposed to be delivered during his stay in Jakarta, but actually wasn't because of some unavoidable changes in his itinerary), Available at: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe\\_0118e.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html).

2023 Speech by Prime Minister Kishida at the banquet at the State Guest House, Akasaka Palace commemorating the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation: Striving for Peace and Prosperity through Co-creation based on Trust. Available at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100645440.pdf>.

NAKAYAMA, MASASHI

1992 «Reisengo kokuren to Nihon no kokusai kouken (The Post-Cold War United Nations and Japan's International Contribution)», *Sodai Heiwa Kenkyu*, 13, 81-119.

OGA, TORU

2003 «Nihon gaiko to aidentiti: "Ajia Taiheiyo" kara "Higashi Ajia" e (Japanese Diplomacy and Identity: From "Asia-Pacific" to "East Asia")», *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu*, 54, 127-152.

OYAMA, TAKATOSHI

2015 "Kokusai kouken" ni miru Nihon no kokusaikankei ninshiki (Japan's perception of international as seen in "International Contribution" relations), *Kokusai Seiji*, 180, 127-152.

RAVENHILL, J.

2001 *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism*, Cambridge University Press.

SAM-SANG, J.

2011 Identity Crisis and Ideology: The Case of Meiji Japan, *Northeast Asian Studies*, 15, 1-28.

SINGH, B.

2002 ASEAN's Perceptions of Japan: Change and Continuity, *Asian Survey*, 42(2), 276-296.

SUZUKI, S.

2005 Japan's socialization into Janus-faced European international society, *European Journal of International Relations*, 11 (1), 137-164.

TAKAHATA, AKIO

2009 *A Shaky Start for Hatoyama's Yuai Diplomacy*, Tokyo Foundation for Research Policy, Available at: <https://www.tokyofoundation.org/research/detail.php?id=123>.

TAN, S. S.

2020 Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America's "free and open Indo-Pacific" strategy, *International Affairs*, 96 (1), 131-148.

TANAKA, A.

2017 *Japan in Asia: Post-Cold-War Diplomacy*, Tokyo: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture.

TANAKA, Y.

1999 Posuto Betonamu Tounan Ajia anteika seisaku to shitenō Fukuda Dokutorin (Fukuda Doctrine as a Stabilization Policy for Post-Vietnam Southeast Asia), *Ajia Kenkyu*, 45(1), 29-60

TANKHA, B.

2021 Japan in Asia: questioning statesponsored Asianism, A. Cheng and S. Kumar (eds.), *Historians of Asia on Political Violence*, Collège de France.

TOGO, K.

2004 Japan and ASEM, W. Stokhof, P. van der Velde, YJ Hwee (eds.), *The Eurasian Space: Far More Than Two Continents*, ISEAS Publishing, Singapore, 155-171.

YAMAMURO, S.

*Hana Umezawa / Identity at the Crossroads: Japan's Role  
in Regional Community Building in East Asia*

1998 Nihon gaiko to Ajia shugi no kosaku (The Intersection of Japanese Diplomacy and Asianism), *Nenpo Seijigaku*, 49, 3-32.

USAMI, M.

2007 Kachi no gaiko wa Nihon gaiko no shin-kijiku to nariuruka (Can “value-oriented diplomacy” become a new aspect of Japanese diplomacy?), *Rippo to Chosa (Legislation and Research)*, 272, 3-12.

ZHANG, Y.

2014 Multilateral means for bilateral ends: Japan, regionalism, and China-Japan-US trilateral dynamism, *The Pacific Review*, 27(1), 5-25.