

A Forgotten Protagonist of European Communism: Franz Marek and the Transnational Communist Debate¹

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Abstract

This article provides an analysis of the relations and influences between a forgotten protagonist of transnational communism in the twentieth century, the Austrian Franz Marek, and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). By tracing these very relations, it is possible to understand the importance of transnational political and intellectual networks for the international communist movement. Focusing on the period ranging from 1945 to Marek's death in 1979, the article interprets the importance of Marek as a Marxist intellectual and political figure in Europe. From his prominent role in the Austrian Communist Party, to his engagement in theoretical discussions, Marek's life was that of a fervent Marxist. Whether as a political interlocutor or Marxist philosopher and theorist, in both cases the PCI was interested in the words of Franz Marek and fascinated by his theoretical thoughts. His studies of Gramsci were the proverbial cherry on the cake. Not only did he not become an outlaw when ousted from the Austrian Communist Party in 1970, the exchange continued to intensify, and he was involved to some extent in all theoretical discussions of the PCI, even though this posed a problem for many a brother party.

Key words: Marek, Communism, Gramsci, Eurocommunism, Austrian Communist Party

Parole chiave: Marek, comunismo, Gramsci, eurocomunismo, Partito comunista austriaco

Introduction

Franz Marek is one of those figures of the past century whose name hardly plays a role in public or scientific discourse. Only recently has a new generation of researchers set out to save his memory from oblivion². Marek belonged to those communist intellectuals who after 1956 increasingly distanced themselves from the dogmas of the international movement, longed for a new orientation of communism and finally came to a «Eurocommunist» interpretation in the 1960s. It was precisely because Marek was a man who advocated progressive thoughts and change in the world movement that the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI)

¹ This article was produced in the course of research on the project *Franz Marek: Vom Widerstandskämpfer über den Apparatschik zum europäischen Reformkommunisten*, financed by the *Jubiläumsfonds der Österreichischen Nationalbank*, Projekt-No. 17492.

² The recently published memoirs of Franz Marek's life impressively show the significance he has had for the transnational and international history of the 20th century. See: *Franz Marek. Beruf und Berufung Kommunist. Lebenserinnerungen und Schlüsseltexte*, a c. Di M. Graf, S. Knoll, Mandelbaum, Wien 2017, especially chapter «Erinnerungen», pp. 109-23. Marek's memoirs can be found in Vienna in the archive of the Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes.

took an interest in him. This article traces the influences of Italian communism on Marek's thinking and the PCI's connection to Marek, locating him in the communist, transnational intellectual and reform discourse³.

Before the connection between the PCI and Marek comes to the fore, however, a brief look at Franz Marek's life should be taken in order to better classify his biography and its significance in the context of European history. Who was this man that Eric Hobsbawm described as a «hero» of the twentieth century?⁴ He was born Ephraim Feuerlicht on 18 April 1913 in Przemyśl in Habsburg Galicia as the child of a Jewish family. Soon the family moved to Vienna in the milieu of the East Jewish misery of the Leopoldstadt. This part of the imperial capital was politically and socially influenced by different cultures⁵. Marek soon experienced the influence of Judaism and Zionism. He was involved in the creation of the *Verband zionistischer Mittelschüler* (Association of Zionist Middle School Students) but was also shaped by Vienna's social democracy that set the tone in the interwar period. This led to his entry into the *Hashomer Hazair*, a socialist and Zionist youth movement⁶. The escalation of the political situation in Austria in the first half of the 1930s brought him closer to communist ideas. Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß abolished democracy in March 1933 under the pretext of the «self-elimination» of parliament and banned the Communist Party of Austria (Kommunistische Partei Österreichs, KPÖ). After the February Uprising of 1934, the smashing of social democracy and the final establishment of an authoritarian regime, Marek decided to join the Communist Party and resist the dictatorship. Now Ephraim Feuerlicht became «Franz Marek». Between 1934 and 1938 he was active in the underground against the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg regime⁷. From July 1936 he headed the department of agitation and propaganda of the CP. After the «Anschluss» of Austria to Germany in March 1938, Marek emigrated via Switzerland into exile in France. In the preceding years, an emigration centre had formed there, where regime opponents found refuge not only from Germany but also from Italy and Spain⁸. As a result of the «Anschluss», various political groups immigrated from Austria. However, cooperation was not feasible after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939 and its

³ Although Marek's life is also a testimony to the history of European communism in the 20th century, this article highlights his importance in the Italian and Eurocommunist context. For a thorough analysis of Franz Marek's life, his connections to politicians and intellectuals, his role in the resistance movements in Austria and France and the history of Austrian communism, see: Maximilian Graf et al., *Franz Marek. Ein europäischer Marxist*, Mandelbaum, Wien 2019 (forthcoming).

⁴ E. Hobsbawm, *My Hero Franz Marek*, in «The Guardian», 12/12/2009. (<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/dec/12/eric-hobsbawm-hero-franz-marek>).

⁵ *Die Mazzesinsel. Juden in der Wiener Leopoldstadt 1918-1938*, a c. Di R. Beckermann, Löcker, Wien 1992, pp. 19-20. Also: Graf, Knoll, *Franz Marek*, cit., p. 19.

⁶ M. Graf, S. Knoll, *Franz Marek*, cit., pp. 22-24.

⁷ *Ivi.*, pp. 25-27.

⁸ M. Margairaz, D. Tartakowsky, *Le Front populaire*, Larousse, Paris 2009; R. Schor, *L'opinion française et les étrangers en France 1919-1939*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 1985.

communist justification⁹. At that time Marek co-edited the *Nouvelles d'Autriche–Österreichische Nachrichten*. After the collapse of the French army in June 1940, he went back underground, which he commented with the following lines in his memoirs: «This return to the illegal work – even more so under conditions in which illegality in Austria appeared to be child's play – gave me again, to an increased degree, that feeling of happiness, which had already gripped me in Austria: Every day seemed to me a day won [...]»¹⁰. Marek became active in the French Resistance and – after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 – committed himself against the occupation. Among other things, his field of work included the printing of leaflets and the publication of the newspaper *Soldat im Westen*. He escaped prison for a long time but was arrested in August 1944 during an SS raid and put on death row. Only through luck – the liberation from Paris – did he escape certain death. In August 1945, he responded to the KPÖ's call. Back in Austria, he again headed the agitation and propaganda department of the KPÖ's Central Committee (CC), became editor-in-chief of the theoretical newspaper *Weg und Ziel* in 1946, and from 1948 belonged to the political bureau.

In Austria, the situation for the communist party was rather difficult: the KPÖ was not the party of the working class. The Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ) played the role of the «Workers' Party», dating back to its significance in the interwar period. However, the socialist party took on increasingly social democratic traits. The division of Austria into four occupation zones until May 1955 made the work of the KPÖ even more difficult¹¹. This was not least due to the behaviour of the Soviet occupying forces – with which many identified the KPÖ – and the deterring examples of the events in the new «People's democracies» of Eastern Europe. Therefore, the communists never reached more than 6 percent of the votes in national elections¹². Similar to the PCI, the Austrian CP was also represented in the government until 1947. Already in the elections of November 1945, however, the weak results of the KPÖ led to its marginalization. Moscow categorically rejected the KPÖ's plan to establish a «People's democracy» in the Soviet-occupied east of the country¹³. After the end of the occupation of Austria in 1955, the KPÖ lost all influence over the country's politics due to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union.

⁹ S. Courtois, M. Lazar, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Français*, PUF, Paris 1995, pp. 135-61; P. Buton, *Le Parti, la guerre et la révolution 1939-1940*, in «Communisme», 32-34, 1993, pp. 41-68, G. Quagliariello, *Il PCI, il PCF e le conseguenze del patto Molotov-Ribbentrop*, in *La nazione in rosso. Socialismo, Comunismo e «Questione nazionale» 1889-1953*, a c. di M. Cattaruzza, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2005, pp. 241-96.

¹⁰ F. Marek, *Erinnerungen*, cit., p. 151.

¹¹ On the KPÖ between 1945 and 1955 see: M. Mugrauer, *Die Politik der KPÖ in den Jahren 1945 bis 1955/56*, in *90 Jahre KPÖ. Studien zur Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei*, a c. di M. Mugrauer, Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft, Wien 2009, pp. 37-52.

¹² J. Meisel, *Die Mauer im Kopf. Erinnerungen eines ausgeschlossenen Kommunisten 1945-1970*, Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, Wien 1986; F. Muhri, *Kein Ende der Geschichte*, Globus, Wien 1995, pp. 136-37.

¹³ W. Mueller, *The USSR and the Fate of Austrian Communism 1944-1956*, in «Qualestoria», n. 1, 2017, pp. 63-88; W. Mueller, *Die Teilung Österreichs als politische Option für KPÖ und UdSSR 1948*, in «Zeitgeschichte», n. 1, 2005, pp. 47-54.

A true Stalinist

At the time when Marek returned to Vienna, he was still a fervent Stalinist and nothing pointed to a reform path¹⁴. In general, it was Marek's task to explain to the party members all the changes in Soviet politics – as difficult as this was. This also applied to the split between Stalin and Tito in June 1948 or the show trials in Eastern Europe¹⁵. Since 1945, the KPÖ had consistently praised the development in Yugoslavia. As early as April 1946, Yugoslavia was described as «the most free, most democratic and most advanced state in the non-Soviet world»¹⁶. However, it was difficult to deal with Belgrade's territorial claims on Austria. After Yugoslavia had publicly demanded territories in southern Austria in the context of the Austrian State Treaty negotiations at the turn of the year 1946/47¹⁷, the KPÖ, which was still in government responsibility, rejected these claims. However, it criticised its coalition partners for failing to establish good relations with Yugoslavia, which had caused the demand for parts of Carinthia and Styria in the first place¹⁸. This attitude is an expression of the communist policy of the period between the end of 1945 and November 1947, when the KPÖ left the government. The KPÖ demanded autonomy for the Carinthian Slovenes and lamented the oppression of the minority and its defamation as alleged agents of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union by the political leaders in Austria. It branded the questionable Austrian minority policy as a continuation of German policies of deportation and extermination¹⁹. As late as May 1948, Marek used the example of Yugoslavia to introduce his readers to the concept of unity lists and unity parties in «People's democracies». He referred to the historical experience of the «struggle for national liberation», which had led to the early formation of a «people's front» under the leadership of the communists²⁰.

Accordingly, the resolution of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) of June 1948 hit the Austrian communists unprepared. Soviet-Yugoslav relations had deteriorated since the beginning of 1948. Belgrade was criticized by Moscow for its support of the communist struggle in Greece, for its ambitions in Albania

¹⁴ M. Graf, S. Knoll, *Franz Marek*, cit., pp. 39-41.

¹⁵ On the KPÖ and the show trials see: F. Keller, *Die KPÖ und die Schauprozesse in Osteuropa 1948 bis 1953*, in «*Ich habe den Tod verdient*». *Schauprozesse und politische Verfolgung in Mittel- und Osteuropa 1945-1956*, a. c. di W. Maderthaner et al., Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, Wien 1991, pp. 199-218; see also: M. Graf, *The Austrian Communists and the Show trials. The Unposed Question of Denunciation*, in *Show Trials, Concentration and Labour Camps and the Fate of Political Refugees before and after World War II*, a. c. di Z. Maruzsa, ELTE BTK, Budapest 2011, pp. 87-93.

¹⁶ O. L[angbein], *Die Kommunistische Partei Jugoslawiens*, in «Weg und Ziel 4», n. 4, 1946, pp. 221-25, here: 221.

¹⁷ G. Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945-1955*, Böhlau, Wien 2005, pp. 63-67; S. Karner, P. Ruggenthaler, *Stalin, Tito und die Österreichfrage. Zur Österreichpolitik des Kreml im Kontext der sowjetischen Jugoslawienpolitik 1945 bis 1949*, in «Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung», 2008, pp. 81-105.

¹⁸ Österreichische Volksstimme, 17.01.1947.

¹⁹ O. Langbein, *Zur Kärntner Slowenenfrage*, in «Weg und Ziel 5», n. 6, 1947, pp. 402-16.

²⁰ F. Marek, *Einheitslisten, Einheitsparteien und Volksdemokratie*, in «Weg und Ziel 6», n. 5, 1948, pp. 337-49, here: 343.

and not least for its plan to establish a joint Balkan federation with Bulgaria²¹. The KPÖ was faced with a challenge. Not only among the Carinthian comrades who adhered to the *Osvobodilna Fronta za Koroško*, the liberation front for Carinthia, but also in the party leadership there were numerous Tito sympathisers²². Ernst Fischer, another high-ranking intellectual of the KPÖ also tended towards Tito, but as a Stalinist he eventually accepted Moscow's interpretation and condemned the Yugoslav Communist leader Tito – foremost in his play *Der große Verrat* (The great betrayal)²³. In the rigid bipolar logic of the Stalinist discourse Fischer had a Soviet envoy announce the new general line in his propaganda work: «Today there are nothing but two fronts. No grass grows between the fronts, no tree blossoms»²⁴.

For the simple members of the party, who had so far been provided with jubilant reports about Yugoslavia, the sudden turn was in any case hardly comprehensible and caused fierce discussions²⁵. Marek remembered: «Except for a few workers who preserved their independence of thought, we were convinced of Yugoslav culpability. [...] It would never have occurred to me that Stalin might be wrong». He edited a special issue of *Weg und Ziel*, «whose main thesis was the nationalism of Yugoslav communists, which we had felt in their demands for Carinthia»²⁶. True internationalism, Marek wrote to the excommunicated comrades, consisted in «defending national sovereignty in every country against American big business,» describing Tito as the «darling of the Dollar.» According to Marek, the Yugoslav partisan struggle, previously portrayed as the nucleus of a progressive «People's democracy», had only been successful due to the intervention of the Red Army. «One cannot be a socialist without standing by the Soviet Union», Marek noted, and without acknowledging that the CPSU is the «teacher of all communists»²⁷. In retrospect, Marek was able to derive at least one thing from his writing: «After all, back then and later there were no «Gestapo agents», «American agents», «fascist murderers», etc. in my writings. That was all I was capable of at the time»²⁸. As much as he thereby distinguished himself from many of his comrades at home and

²¹ J. Perovic, *The Tito-Stalin Split. A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence*, in «Journal of Cold War Studies», n. 2, 2007, pp. 32-63; I. Banac, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1988; M. Kramer, *Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet-East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948-1953*, in *The Balkans in the Cold War*, a c. di S. Rajak et al., Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2017, pp. 29-63; G. Procacci, *The Cominform. Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1994.

²² M. Rauchensteiner, *Stalinplatz 4*, cit., p. 145.

²³ Ibid.; E. Fischer, *Das Ende einer Illusion*, cit., pp 265-76.

²⁴ E. Fischer, *Der große Verrat. Ein politisches Drama in fünf Akten*, Globus Verlag, Wien 1950, p. 32; G. Stocker, *Der Kalte Krieg in der Österreichischen Literatur. Ein Überblick*, in *Kalter Krieg in Österreich. Literatur - Kunst - Kultur*, a c. di M. Hansel et al., Zsolnay, Wien 2010, pp. 59-90.

²⁵ For details see: M. Graf, *The Austrian Communist's Dealing with the Ideological and Territorial Conflicts in the Alps-Adriatic Region (1945-1955)*, in «Qualestoria», n. 1, 2017, pp. 43-61.

²⁶ F. Marek, *Erinnerungen*, cit., p. 173.

²⁷ F. Marek, *Was lehrt uns die Kritik an den Führern der KP Jugoslawiens?*, in «Weg und Ziel 7», 1948, Sonderheft August, pp. 569-96, here: 571, 574, 575.

²⁸ F. Marek, *Erinnerungen*, cit., p. 173.

abroad, he was not consistent in this respect. In later years he also used the term «fascism» in connection with Yugoslavia²⁹.

A new connection

On 22 January 1951, Franz Marek was involved in an accident while driving near Florence, together with members of the PCI. The Italian comrades Ilio Barontini, Leonardo Leonardi and Otello Frangioni lost their lives³⁰. The serious injuries forced Marek to stay in hospital in Italy for several months. Retrospectively, he recalled: «Again the great experience, the great party, the deep roots in the masses, [...] poor devils came to the hospital to bring me an orange [...] [this] moved me more than the visits of Longo, Pajetta etc., as much as they honored me. And shortly after I had overcome the shock and the operation – the discovery of Gramsci, not only the letters from prison – those were all available in German –, but also the other works. Although printed only censored at that time, they made a tremendous impression, the narrowness of our “Marxism-Leninism” dawned on me – immediately after 1956 I resorted to Gramsci»³¹. This discovery shaped Marek’s ideas for decades to come³².

1956 was indeed a crucial turning point for the communist world. Three events were decisive for this³³. The first was Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech at the XX Party Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev introduced a new policy and opened up the theory of «peaceful coexistence»³⁴, thereby breaking the dogma of an inevitable war between capitalism and socialism. Now, for the USSR also different ways to socialism were not excluded and the establishment of a socialist society via parliamentarism was conceivable³⁵. Italian Secretary General Palmiro Togliatti seized the opportunity and stressed that it was now up to his party to «pave the Italian way to socialism»³⁶.

²⁹ Id., *Der schöpferische Marxismus und der «veraltete» Marx*, in «Weg und Ziel 8», n. 11, 1950, pp. 766-73; F. Marek, *Zum Fall André Marty*, in «Weg und Ziel 11», n. 2, 1953, pp. 99-104, here: 103.

³⁰ *Il mortale scontro a 9 Km. da Firenze*, in «l’Unità», 23/1/1951.

³¹ F. Marek, *Erinnerungen*, cit., p. 177.

³² This has been acknowledged by Peter Weinberger, a collaborator at the «Wiener Tagebuch» in the 1970s in a recent interview with the author: Interview with Peter Weinberger (8 January 2018). Examples of Marek’s writings on Gramsci: F. Marek, *Antonio Gramsci*, in «Weg und Ziel 24», n. 2, 1966, pp. 99-109; *Antonio Gramsci. Zu seinem 30. Todestag*, in «Weg und Ziel 24», n. 4, 1967, pp. 183-95.

³³ See: K. Ruzicic-Kessler, *Die Kommunistische Partei Italiens und das Jahr 1956*, in «Jahrbuch für Mitteleuropäische Studien», 2015/2016, pp. 121-37; M. L. Righi, *Quel terribile 1956. I verbali della Direzione comunista tra il XX Congresso del Pcus e l’VIII Congresso del Pci*, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1996.

³⁴ S. Pons, *The Global Revolution. A History of International Communism 1917-1991*, University Press, Oxford 2014, pp. 206-08; R. Hornsby, *Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev’s Soviet Union*, University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp. 54-57.

³⁵ *Il PCI e il 1956. Scritti e documenti dal XX Congresso del Pcus ai fatti d’Ungheria*, a c. di A. Höbel, La città del sole, Napoli 2006, p. 22.

³⁶ C. Spagnolo, *Togliatti e il movimento comunista internazionale (1956-64)*, in *Togliatti nel suo tempo*, a c. di R. Gualtieri et al., Carocci, Roma 2007, pp. 239-63, here: p. 253.

This new policy was a logical consequence of the world situation in 1956. After all, in 1955 the Soviet leadership had been able to improve relations with Yugoslavia³⁷ with an admission of the wrong policy towards Belgrade³⁸. In addition, the Cominform was dissolved after the XX Party Congress. Togliatti made it clear in *l'Unità* that it «does not mean that if one party makes a mistake, that all have made a mistake»³⁹. According to him, it was not by chance that the upheavals in the communist movement took place at a time when the world was separating itself from colonialism, a détente between East and West was on the agenda, and socialism was taking on new forms⁴⁰. For him, the secret speech was an event eclipsing all events of recent years⁴¹.

The publication of the secret speech by the *New York Times* on 4 June shocked many comrades in the Western European CPs⁴². In the June edition of *Nuovi Argomenti*, Togliatti blamed the incompetence of the Soviet leadership and Stalin for the problems in the communist movement⁴³. For Togliatti, the communist system had now become «polycentric» and there was thus not «a single leadership,» but a process that took «different paths.» Despite everything, the Soviet system «is the best, since – apart from the Stalinist crimes – it enabled a completely free, democratic society» and «the founding of the Soviet Union represents the most important event in contemporary history»⁴⁴. Franz Marek followed these events and had the theses of Togliatti printed in translation in a special issue of *Weg und Ziel*⁴⁵. His own argumentation on the events was not dissimilar to Togliatti's: «The events show that one cannot blindly trust the Soviet Union. Proof: Yugoslavia [...]. No communist and no

³⁷ G. Procacci, *The Cominform*, cit.; S. Pons, *Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, in «Journal of Cold War Studies 3», n. 2, 2001, pp. 3-27, here: pp. 16-21, E. Aga-Rossi, V. Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin. Il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archivi di Mosca*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2007, pp. 221 f; M. Zuccari, *Il dito sulla piaga. Togliatti e il Pci nella rottura fra Stalin e Tito 1944-1957*, Mursia, Milano 2008.

³⁸ S. Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War. Reconciliation, comradeship, confrontation 1953-1957*, Routledge, London-New York 2011, pp. 126-128.

³⁹ P. Togliatti, *Lo scioglimento dell'Ufficio di informazione e i nuovi compiti dei partiti comunisti*, in «l'Unità», 18.04.1956.

⁴⁰ *Da Gramsci a Berlinguer. La via italiana al socialismo attraverso i congressi del Partito comunista italiano*, vol. III, 1956-1964, a c. di F. Benvenuti, Calendario, Roma 1985, pp. 18 e sg.

⁴¹ I. Montanelli, M. Cervi, *Storia d'Italia*, vol. XVIII, *L'Italia dei due Governi 1955-1965*, BUR, Milano 2011, pp. 34-37; P. Togliatti, *Il XX congresso del partito comunista dell'Unione sovietica*, in «l'Unità», 14.04.1956; See also: M. Clementi, *L'alleato Stalin. L'ombra sovietica sull'Italia di Togliatti e De Gasperi*, Rizzoli, Milano 2011; M. Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito. Tra identità nazionale e internazionalismo*, Carocci, Roma 2005; R. Gualtieri, *Togliatti e la politica estera italiana. Dalla Resistenza al trattato di pace 1943-1947*, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1995.

⁴² F. Froio, *Il PCI nell'anno dell'Ungheria*, Espresso, Roma 1980, p. 96; A. Frigerio, *Budapest 1956. La macchina del fango. La stampa del PCI e la rivoluzione ungherese. Un caso esemplare di disinformazione*, Lindau, Torino 2016, p. 30; C. Spagnolo, *Togliatti e il movimento comunista*, cit., p. 254.

⁴³ *Intervista a Togliatti*, in «Nuovi Argomenti», n. 20, 1956; *Togliatti. Opere*, IV, a c. di L. Gruppi, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1986, pp. 125-47; A. Höbel, *Il PCI e il 1956*, cit., pp. 71-92.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ P. Togliatti, *Probleme der Entwicklung der sozialistischen Demokratie*, in «Weg und Ziel 14», 1956, Sondernummer Juli, pp. 577-606

communist party is relieved of the necessity of self-critical thinking. [...] Even the leadership of a socialist state can make mistakes [...]»⁴⁶. Marek continued to praise the successes of the Soviet Union in foreign policy and, despite his doubts, did not want to disillusion the simple party members. After all, Khrushchev meant hope for a positive change⁴⁷. This shows that Marek and Togliatti formulated quite similar thoughts on the XX party congress. Both continued to believe in the Soviet Union, both saw the mistakes of the past and wanted to take a new path. In any case, with his idea of «polycentrism» Togliatti succeeded in the theoretical transition from a strict adherence to the dogmas of Moscow to a thesis that envisaged greater autonomy for CPs and thus moved from the idea of a single guiding star of the world movement to that of several, parallel but different paths to socialism⁴⁸.

These turbulent moments were followed by two decisive crises in the international communist context. When the workers in Poznan took to the streets at the end of June to demand better living and working conditions, the Polish leadership was confronted with a situation that had developed in prior months. The city's industrial workers criticized working conditions and outlined the impossibility of meeting the demands of the political elite. The protest quickly escalated into an armed conflict between security forces and demonstrators. Between 28 and 29 June 57 people died, and hundreds more were injured⁴⁹. The PCI saw the suppression of the protest as a necessary step to restore order⁵⁰. Only few cadres opposed the official party line⁵¹. Even more serious, however, was the suppression of the uprising in Hungary in October/November 1956. The events in Budapest led to an escalation in the struggle between Togliatti and trade union leader Giuseppe Di Vittorio, while the party media and the leadership of the PCI were anxious to justify the intervention of the Soviet Union and to portray it as inevitable⁵². It should also be noted that Moscow's understanding for Togliatti's criticism on the XX party congress was no longer present after the crises of Poznan and Budapest. Now «polycentric» ideas were rather unacceptable⁵³. In any case, at the VIII party congress, held shortly after the events of Hungary, the leadership of the PCI was committed to silencing the voices that had cast doubt on Soviet politics.

⁴⁶ F. Marek, *Gedanken zum 20. Parteitag*, in «Weg und Ziel 14», n.7/8, 1956, pp. 479-84, here: p. 482. See also: F. Marek, *Aus der internationalen Diskussion zum 20. Parteitag*, in «Weg und Ziel 14», n. 9, 1956, pp. 587-97.

⁴⁷ F. Marek, *Erinnerungen*, cit., pp. 184-86.

⁴⁸ A. Agosti, *Palmiro Togliatti. A Biography*, Tauris, New York 2003, pp. 238-40; Also: N. Dörr, *Die rote Gefahr. Der italienische Eurokommunismus als sicherheitspolitische Herausforderung für die USA und Westdeutschland 1969-1979*, Böhlau, Köln 2017, pp. 79-82.

⁴⁹ On Poznan see: M. Kramer, *Soviet-Polish Relations and the Crisis of 1956. Brinkmanship and Intra-Bloc Politics*, in *Kommunismus in der Krise. Die Entstalinisierung 1956 und die Folgen*, a c. di R. Engelmann et al., Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, Göttingen 2008, pp. 61-126, here: pp. 81-83.

⁵⁰ *Il lavoro è ripreso nella città polacca di Poznan. Isolati i provocatori dei sanguinosi incidenti di giovedì*, in «l'Unità», 30.06.1956.

⁵¹ G. Di Vittorio, *Il dolore della Cgil per i fatti di Poznan*, in «l'Unità», 1/7/1956; *Le dichiarazioni di Di Vittorio*, in «l'Unità», 2.07.1956.

⁵² G. C. Pajetta, *La tragedia dell'Ungheria*, in «l'Unità», 28/10/1956; A. Frigerio, *Budapest 1956*, cit., p. 160.

⁵³ C. Spagnolo, *Togliatti e il movimento comunista*, cit., p. 257.

Many had to leave the party, but at the same time the old Stalinist guard made way for new faces to support Togliatti's course⁵⁴. The same happened in the KPÖ, where the discussion was broken off in favour of party unity⁵⁵. Marek, too, was not ready to criticise the Soviet Union. For him, Hungary had not been consistent in implementing the decisions of the XX congress of the CPSU⁵⁶. At that time, he placed his hope in a renewal in the Soviet Union and in Togliatti: «My decision was: Togliatti is right, one has to investigate the real causes of a development, which despite horrible crimes one cannot portray as a crime novel of the “cult of personality”. [...]. With the Soviet Union renewing itself, the whole movement must also renew itself»⁵⁷. The KPÖ orientated itself along «Austria's path to socialism» as a mirror of Italian developments. This became visible in the party program of 1958⁵⁸. Thereafter, Marek consequently demanded the resignation of the entire party leadership after the failure of the KPÖ in the 1959 elections, which at least suggests a break with the apparatus in Austria⁵⁹.

Franz Marek, the international movement and the PCI

In the 1960s, Marek became more and more disillusioned. Although he continued to believe in the Soviet Union, events such as the conflict between Moscow and Beijing made a negative impression on him. He commented the conflict according to the Soviet perspective in *Weg und Ziel*.⁶⁰ The discussion in the Western European CPs, however, became more and more important for Marek during these years and he thought that details of the discussion in the French and Italian parties often interested him more than the politics of the KPÖ⁶¹. After all, in the 1960s the repression of artists in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev was another factor that slowly but surely distanced Marek from Moscow. He expressed clear criticism of this policy and exhorted «patience and respect» for the «search and attempts» of the

⁵⁴ See: P. Togliatti, *Per una via italiana al socialismo. Per un governo democratico delle classi lavoratrici. Rapporto all'VIII. congresso del PCI, 8/12/1956*, in A. Höbel, *Il PCI e il 1956*, cit., pp. 169 e sg.; *L'intervento di Antonio Giolitti al congresso del Pci nel 1956*, in «Micromega», n. 9, 2006; A. Frigerio, *Budapest 1956*, cit., p. 197; *Riunione della Direzione, 8/1/1957*, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci [FIG], Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano [APCI], Fondo Mosca, mf. 197.

⁵⁵ M. Mugrauer, *Zwischen Erschütterung, neuer Offenheit und «Normalisierung». Die KPÖ, der 20. Parteitag der KPdSU und die Ungarn-Krise 1956*, in: *Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende*, a c di W. Mueller, M. Portmann, Verlag der OEAW, Wien 2007, pp. 257-97.

⁵⁶ F. Marek, *Zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn*, in «Weg und Ziel 14», n. 12, 1956, pp. 866-76.

⁵⁷ Id., *Erinnerungen*, cit., p. 186.

⁵⁸ *Der Weg Österreichs zum Sozialismus. Programmatische Leitsätze, beschlossen von einer Konferenz der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs am 19. und 20. Februar 1958*, a c. Di KPÖ, Wien 1958; L. Spira, *Ein gescheiterter Versuch. Der Austro-Eurokommunismus, Jugend und Volk*, Wien-München 1979, pp. 35-36.

⁵⁹ E. Fischer, *Das Ende einer Illusion. Erinnerungen 1945-1955*, Molden, Wien-München-Zürich 1973, pp. 163-67.

⁶⁰ F. Marek, *Zu den Differenzen in der kommunistischen Weltbewegung*, in «Weg und Ziel 21», n. 9, 1963, pp. 553-64; Id., «Hart» und «weich» in der Weltpolitik, in «Weg und Ziel 21», n. 10, 1963, pp. 634-43.

⁶¹ Id., *Erinnerungen*, cit., p. 167.

artists⁶². In the Sino-Soviet conflict, the PCI tried to counter any development that could lead to an open condemnation of China and a split in the world movement. In December 1962 Togliatti articulated his views at the X party congress of the PCI and paid respect to his Chinese comrades⁶³. At the same time, he reprimanded them for their attitude during the Cuban missile crisis. Togliatti also took the opportunity to invoke «peaceful coexistence» and to portray it as a means for guaranteeing the freedom of all peoples and not as a tool to maintain the status quo⁶⁴. Thereafter, the Chinese press accused Togliatti of calling on the oppressed peoples not to fight and thus to clear the path for imperialism⁶⁵. Marek's commentary at the CC Plenary Session of the KPÖ in January 1963 entitled «Problems of the Communist World Movement,» later printed in *Volksstimme*⁶⁶, had a special meaning for the Italian party, which printed it in *l'Unità*⁶⁷. Marek had made it clear in his speech that the Cuban crisis had revealed the divergences in the communist movement. The Chinese CP had seen a victory of «imperialist» forces in the crisis and its solution. «The differences of opinion with the Chinese comrades are due to the fact that they reject the basic ideas of the XX party congress [of the CPSU] about the politics of coexistence, the paths to socialism, [and] the condemnation of the cult of personality»⁶⁸. Marek saw a deep split on the issue of war and peace, considering that the Chinese comrades did not follow the line of peaceful coexistence. The Italian communists saw in this interpretation the right way to deal with the crisis and reaffirmed in *l'Unità* the words of the Austrian communist. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Marek was invited to Florence in November 1963 to discuss «Peaceful Coexistence.» The debate took place among well-known personalities of communist media, including Mario Alicata (director of *l'Unità*), Lucio Libertini (director of *Mondo Nuovo*), Jean Duret (*Conseil économique* of the CGT), Serge Mallet (*France Observateur*) and Marek of *Weg und Ziel*⁶⁹.

Palmiro Togliatti died on 21 August 1964 in Crimea. The coincidence of Togliatti's death with the formulation of his statement for the Soviet leadership, also known as the «Memorandum of Yalta», marked a milestone in the development of «polycentrism» and paved the way for «Eurocommunism.» The memorandum was intended as a personal communication to Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership, discussing questions of the international movement⁷⁰. He wanted to use the influence of the Italian party to guide the positions within international communism

⁶² M. Graf, *Frühstart des «Eurokommunismus»? Das Experiment der KPÖ und die Konferenzen westeuropäischer KPs im Kontext der europäischen Reformkommunisten der Sechzigerjahre*, in «Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung», 2017, pp. 217-32; F. Marek, *Kunstdiskussion*, in «Weg und Ziel 21», n. 6, 1963, pp. 413-15.

⁶³ *Togliatti al X Congresso*, in «l'Unità», 3/12/1962.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Infondate le polemiche dei comunisti cinesi*, in «l'Unità», 31/12/1962.

⁶⁶ *Probleme der kommunistischen Weltbewegung*, in «Volksstimme», 9/1/1963.

⁶⁷ *Critiche americane e austriache al P. C. cinese*, in «l'Unità», 12/1/1963.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Dibattito sulla coesistenza pacifica*, in «l'Unità», 3/11/1963.

⁷⁰ C. Spagnolo, *Togliatti e il movimento comunista*, cit., p. 243.

along the lines of the PCI⁷¹. The party had come under serious pressure in previous years and several other communist parties were at least sceptical if not hostile toward the course of the PCI. For Togliatti, however, the differentiation of various parties did not contradict the Soviet Union's guiding role in the world movement. Thus, the idea of the memorandum was to establish the formula of «unity in diversity», to revive polycentrism and to prevent a lasting split between Moscow and Beijing. The PCI published Togliatti's «Memorandum of Yalta» on 5 September 1964 in *Rinascita* without consulting Moscow⁷². Marek also stressed that it had to be possible to take critical positions within the communist movement⁷³. Only a few months after the death of Togliatti, Nikita Khrushchev was ousted from power with a coup within the CPSU and the enthronement of Leonid Brezhnev followed. The PCI delegation, which travelled to Moscow shortly after Khrushchev's demise, was not convinced by the statements of the Soviet comrades and did not join the chorus of critics of the former party secretary⁷⁴. Marek commented that Khrushchev's treatment had confirmed Togliatti's thoughts. Like many other communists, Marek saw the lack of adequate information and discussion as the biggest problem within the movement⁷⁵. In any case, *l'Unità* also printed Austrian criticism in these days⁷⁶.

Although Marek stayed loyal to the Soviet Union for the time being, the idea of reform had captivated him. He articulated this together with some reform-minded comrades at the head of the KPÖ through the program adopted during the XIX party congress of 1965 – which was inspired by the policies of the PCI – and went further than other CPs in terms of autonomy and democracy. This was the beginning of a period of reform and opening in the Austrian Communist Party⁷⁷. Marek was in charge of these developments and established himself as a reformer at the international level. Thus, the theoretical paper of the party *Weg und Ziel* also developed into an important discussion platform for processes in the international communist movement⁷⁸. Although the PCI acknowledged these changes, there was little hope for the Austrian party. The courage of many comrades in the criticism of the developments within the KPÖ, the isolation of the party, the discussion of the thoughts of Togliatti and criticism of the Soviet model, were astonishing developments for the PCI. Nevertheless, Rome did not believe in a change and saw the party secretary Friedl Fűrberg firmly in control. His replacement by Franz Muhri at the party

⁷¹ Id., *Sul Memoriale di Yalta. Togliatti e la crisi del movimento comunista internazionale 1956-1964*, Carocci, Roma 2007.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ F. Marek, *Arbeiterbewegung und sozialistisches Staatensystem*, in «Weg und Ziel 22», n. 6, 1964, pp. 357-62.

⁷⁴ See: E. Macaluso, *Comunisti e riformisti. Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo*, Feltrinelli, Roma 2013.

⁷⁵ F. Marek, *Nachlese zum Memorandum Togliattis*, in «Weg und Ziel 22», n. 12, 1964, pp. 720-24, here: p. 724.

⁷⁶ *I giudizi dei partiti comunisti sugli avvenimenti nell'URSS*, in «l'Unità», 23/10/1964, See also: «Volksstimme», 17/10/1964.

⁷⁷ For more details see: M. Graf, *Frühstart*, cit.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

conference and the takeover of the party leadership by a reform-oriented majority may have been surprising turns of events⁷⁹.

Reforms and international discussions

Another development confirms Marek's role in the context of international communism and the reforms of the 1960s even more clearly: the meetings between representatives of Western European communist parties. Within these meetings, the strategies of the parties in the capitalist West should be coordinated and their autonomy amplified. The first conference of the Western European CPs was held in Rome in 1959. This conference was followed by different meetings and in 1963 preparatory meetings were held in Paris and Stockholm for a new Western European conference⁸⁰. In April 1965 the delegates of the CPs of Western Europe met again in Brussels to discuss the preparation of the conference, its contents and goals. Central topics were the war in Vietnam, German rearmament, European security and the workers' movement. Marek was a delegate of the Austrian party. The Italian representatives attested that he had not spoken much in public, but embraced the Italian position: in «private conversations he always proved to be a good friend who is very well informed about our affairs and other things», acknowledged Giuliano Pajetta⁸¹. At the beginning of June, the second conference of the Western European CPs was held in Brussels. Franz Muhri and Franz Marek were present for the KPÖ. The Italian assessment of the results of this conference was sobering: the «conference was only a beginning; it did not have the character of a debate, but of a series of positions. [...] It did not have the character of a study, a critical debate, an effective search for a common effort for common initiatives and goals»⁸². This also explains the decision to hold another conference. Since the PCI had taken a particularly positive view of Marek's attitude, it is not surprising that Vienna was chosen as the venue for the new conference and Marek as its organiser. At the beginning of August, the KPÖ sent an invitation to all Western European parties. Particularly noteworthy is the Austrian proposal to organise a public conference and to allow the press to attend. The Italian party initially agreed with this in internal discussions⁸³. In October, the foreign section of the PCI discussed issues related to the Vienna conference. Now the Italians took the side of the PCF – with which they had exchanged views on the subject in September – and were against holding a public conference. The Austrian comrades asked for a meeting with representatives of the PCF and the

⁷⁹ *Nota sul congresso del Partito Comunista Austriaco (Direzione del P.C.I. Sezione Esteri)*, FIG, APCI, 1965, Esteri, mf. 527, pp. 1787-91.

⁸⁰ FIG, APCI, 1963, Esteri, mf. 493, pp. 876-79.

⁸¹ *Note informative sulla riunione di Bruxelles, 20 Aprile 1965*, FIG, APCI, 1965, Esteri, mf. 528, pp. 1001-08.

⁸² *Nota sulla Conferenza dei Partiti Comunisti dei paesi capitalistici d'Europa, Bruxelles 1-2-3 giugno 1965*, FIG, APCI, 1965, Esteri, mf. 528, pp. 1097-18.

⁸³ *Lettera del PCA alla direzione del PCI, 5-8-1965*, FIG, APCI, 1965, Esteri, mf. 527, p. 1972.

PCI in Vienna to discuss further proceedings and the character of the conference⁸⁴. Nothing is known about these talks between the three parties. However, they may have agreed on a mode discussed during the preparatory meeting in Vienna in December 1965. The representatives of the CPs of Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Finland, West Berlin and Italy met there. The PCI sent Dino Pelliccia and Carlo Galluzzi. Franz Marek had been the driving force behind the public conference. Since this was no longer feasible, the parties present decided to write daily information for the press and to hold a press conference under Austrian leadership at the end of the meeting⁸⁵. Marek had received a lot of applause from the Italian side during his performance at the preparatory conference. In particular, the PCI liked the fact that he advocated not to display individual party policies and not to hold a «theoretical seminar»⁸⁶. The Vienna Conference finally took place at the beginning of May 1966. Fifteen Western European CPs participated. Franz Marek opened the discussion with the renewed invitation to speak about concrete problems of the workers' movement in Western Europe. In his own contribution, he dealt with these questions. The Italian delegates Pelliccia, Ugo Pecchioli, Leo Canullo and Umberto Scalia testified that Marek had been the only one who reflected «extensively» on the problems of the workers' movement and not only on «the national situation.» In addition, the proximity of the new leadership of the KPÖ to the Italian line was reflected in Marek's criticism of the errors and delays in the development of democracy in Eastern Europe. The PCF representative Raymond Guyot attacked these statements. In addition, Marek made several references to the Italian party. Pecchioli also emphasised the «excellent relations» with Marek, who in a personal conversation proved to be very close to the Italian ideas. The final communiqué of the conference consisted of «various revisions of Marek's draft»⁸⁷. The «Viennese plea» of the 15 communist parties from capitalist states was published in the following days. Therein, the CPs present affirmed the struggle against monopolies, for the unification of the «working and democratic forces» and «social progress.» Beyond the usual criticism of the capitalist system, NATO, the European Economic Community and the American intervention in Vietnam, the PCI was interested in Austria's attitude towards Chinese nuclear weapons. Marek's statement, which in this respect corresponded to the internationalist line loyal to Moscow, according to which the communist parties would have to oppose Beijing's nuclear arming, was in line with the ideas of the PCI⁸⁸. Following these developments, the policy of the KPÖ, under the strong influence of Marek, largely followed the PCI line. After all,

⁸⁴ *Direzione del P.C.I. Sezione Esteri, Nota per la Segreteria, Situazione relativa alla proposta del P.C. Austriaco per una conferenza sulla unità d'azione e la lotta contro i monopoli, 7/10/1965*, FIG, APCI, 1965, Esteri, mf. 527, pp. 1793-94; See also: *Posizione dei Partiti interessati sulla proposta dei compagni austriaci*, *ivi.*, p. 1795.

⁸⁵ *Sulla Conferenza dei Partiti Comunisti dell'Europa occidentale proposta dal P.C. Austriaco. Nota sulla riunione, 17.12.1965*, FIG, APCI, 1965, Esteri, mf. 527, pp. 1801-02.

⁸⁶ *Verbale sommario sullo svolgimento della riunione di Vienna*, FIG, APCI, 1965, Esteri, mf. 527, pp. 1803-06.

⁸⁷ *Informazione sull'incontro dei partiti comunisti dell'Europa occidentale (Vienna, 9-11 maggio 1966)*, FIG, APCI, Esteri, 1966 mf. 537, pp. 1044-48.

⁸⁸ *Appello da Vienna ad una più ampia unità nella lotta contro i monopoli*, in «l'Unità», 13/5/1966.

during the congress of the communist party of Hungary at the end of 1966, both parties agreed that there should be no world conference and no excommunication of China. In contrast to the Eastern European parties, the idea of unity was clearly present⁸⁹. This was also evident at another CP meeting in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in 1967, when the Italian and Austrian Communists positively commented on developments in the Federal Republic of Germany and its *Neue Ostpolitik*, while the PCF took a negative stance⁹⁰.

In this phase of relations between European communist parties, the KPÖ was able to play a disproportionately large role in transnational politics compared to its national importance. This was largely due to Marek. He had become an important reformer and a man of dialogue not only within the Austrian party, but also internationally. The PCI relied on him as a «scout» to Eastern Europe, as the events of Poland in 1968 demonstrate. The PCI and the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) had repeatedly come into conflict in the 1960s, not least because of the differences of opinion between East and West⁹¹. When a campaign «against Zionism» was started in Poland in the spring of 1968, which openly took on anti-Semitic traits⁹², the PCI longed for detailed information. After the Six-Day War in the Middle East in 1967, resulting in Poland breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel, the Polish leadership made the fight against «Zionism» an integral part of its propaganda. After student protests broke out in 1968, the Polish regime accused «Zionists» of being behind the protest. Mistrust of the Jewish citizens, a total of 0.1 percent of the population, was consistently stirred up. By the end of summer 1968, 13.000 Jews had left Poland⁹³. In June, an Italian delegation reached Warsaw. Yet the statements of the Polish comrades did not help to overcome uncertainty about their actions⁹⁴. Party secretary Luigi Longo turned directly to Marek, in whose memories the Italian party leader was appalled by the details of the campaign, which also concerned people he knew personally⁹⁵. Marek's importance can also be seen in his commu-

⁸⁹ *Informazione sulle prese di posizione circa le proposte di una «Conferenza» internazionale in occasione del IX Congresso del P.O.S. Ungherese, Budapest 28/11-3/12/1966*, FIG, APCI, Esteri, 1966 mf. 537, pp. 1083-87, *Ufficio di Segreteria, protocollo n. 2932 (Riservato), 20/12/1966*, *ivi.*, pp. 1088-94.

⁹⁰ See: M. Graf, *Frühstart*, *cit.*

⁹¹ *Riunione della direzione, 12.2.1965*, FIG, APCI, 1965, *Direzione*, 29, pp. 569-80; *Riunione della direzione, 2.3.1965*, *ivi.*, pp. 581-607, *Riunione della direzione, 8.3.1965*, *ivi.*, pp. 608-23, *Relazione della delegazione italiana alla commissione preparatoria della Conferenza mondiale dei partiti comunisti e operai, 24-28 Marzo 1968, 2.5.1968*, FIG, APCI, 1968, Esteri, mf. 553, pp. 672-78.

⁹² «*In Zehntausenden Parteiversammlungen forderten [...] die "Aktivisten die Entfernung" der "Unruhstifter" aus ihren Stellen und die "Auswanderung" der "Zionisten"*», citation in: Włodzimierz Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert*, C.H. Beck, München 2010, p. 315.

⁹³ *Ivi.*, pp. 312-315; see also: Mikołaj Kunicki, *The Red and the Brown: Bolesław Piasecki, the Polish Communists, and the Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland, 1967-68*, in «*East European Politics and Societies 19*», n. 2, 2005, pp. 185-225; Hans-Christian Dahlmann, *Antisemitismus in Polen 1968. Interaktionen zwischen Partei und Gesellschaft*, Fibre, Osnabrück 2013.

⁹⁴ *Nota informativa sulle conversazioni politiche avute a Varsavia da A. Pecorari fra il 4 ed il 10 giugno [1968]*, FIG, APCI, Esteri, mf. 552, pp. 2185-87.

⁹⁵ F. Marek, *Erinnerungen*, *cit.*, p. 229.

nication to his good friend and CC member Ernesto Ragionieri. He warned him: «Be glad that you are not travelling through Warsaw on the journey from Moscow to Prague – that is probably the worst thing that has happened in our name in the past 10 years»⁹⁶. Marek also had the colleagues of *Il Contemporaneo*, a monthly supplement of *Rinascita*, informed about the events. He sent a document of Polish origin to Italy, which strongly criticized the policies of the communist party and revealed the realities of the «anti-Zionist campaign.» The idea was a publication in Italy to minimize the chance of tracing the source. The Italian comrades, however, did not dare to take such a step, since it was a document of «opposition and even agitation»⁹⁷. By the end.

The end of all reforms

In 1968 the events in Czechoslovakia overshadowed any other political discussion. The reform movement in ČSSR had caused an opening of the CP and moved the country away from Moscow. In August, the Warsaw Pact states ended the experiment with a military intervention⁹⁸. Both PCI and KPÖ condemned the invasion and the suppression of the «Prague Spring.» The well-known intellectual of the KPÖ and friend of Marek, Ernst Fischer, demanded an open split with the Soviet Union if it did not withdraw its troops⁹⁹. After the invasion, the PCI and the KPÖ agreed that a further debate on a world conference was not opportune. However, during a visit to Rome at the end of August, Marek pleaded for another conference of the Western European CPs, to coordinate policies regarding the events of Prague. The Italian party showed interest, but did not want to act without the PCF¹⁰⁰. Carlo Galluzzi commented after another meeting with Marek (and Muhri) in September that the Austrian party had internal problems to overcome and that the condemnation of the events in Czechoslovakia met with resistance within the ranks of the KPÖ¹⁰¹. This had become evident during the CC meeting of the KPÖ on 12-13 September. Muhri mitigated the «extreme» position of Fischer and others, but the party saw the restoration of full sovereignty of Czechoslovakia as a necessity. The «formation of groups» and accusations within the KPÖ had now become appar-

⁹⁶ Franz Marek to Ernesto Ragionieri, 6/5/[1968], Sesto Fiorentino, Biblioteca E. Ragionieri, Fondo Ernesto Ragionieri, Corrispondenza, No 1287.

⁹⁷ Bruno Schacherl del *Contemporaneo* all'Ufficio Politico del PCI, 10/5/1968, FIG, APCI, Esteri, mf. 552, pp. 2167-82.

⁹⁸ See: J. Pauer, *Prag 1968. Der Einmarsch des Warschauer Paktes. Hintergründe - Planungen - Durchführung*, Temmen, Bremen 1995.

⁹⁹ M. Mugrauer, *Der «Prager Frühling» und die Parteikrise in der KPÖ*, in *Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968*, a c. di S. Karner et al., Böhlau, Köln 2008, pp. 1043-62, here: p. 1051 e sg.

¹⁰⁰ M. Graf, S. Knoll, *Franz Marek*, cit., pp. 73 e sg.

¹⁰¹ *Incontro del compagno Galluzzi con il presidente del Partito comunista austriaco e con il compagno Marek, membro dell'Ufficio Politico*, 16.9.1968, FIG, APCI, Esteri, mf. 552, p. 94.

ent¹⁰². Marek defended Fischer, although he did not support his approach either. He was still convinced that criticism in the communist camp had to be possible and that this criticism was not per se «anti-Soviet»¹⁰³. These developments in the Austrian party were also a topic in Rome. Pelliccia's information concerning the September meeting with Marek was sighted by the main representatives of the Italian party, including Giorgio Amendola, Enrico Berlinguer, Armando Cossutta, Pietro Ingrao and Alessandro Natta. Pelliccia described that the CC had criticized Ernst Fischer for his statements on Czechoslovakia. For Pelliccia, at any rate, this was a «very dubious discussion», which did not bode well for the party's future¹⁰⁴. The initiative of the two parties to hold a conference of the Western European CPs would probably have been an important opportunity to continue and expand an independent course in the West, but failed because of the rejection of the PCF. The plan was also a thorn in Moscow's side. Indeed, during his trip to the Soviet Union in September 1968, Armando Cossutta picked up a scolding from Mikhail Suslov. He described the Austrian party as «social democratic» and asked Cossutta about the KPÖ-PCI initiative: «What do you want? Where are you going with this?»¹⁰⁵.

The strong commitment of the KPÖ at the international level and the internal reform course, however, did not have a solid foundation. Within the party and with the brother parties in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic more and more resistance against the Austrian course arose. Attacks on the Austrian comrades were directed against Fischer and Marek¹⁰⁶. In preparation for the KPÖ's XX party congress in January 1969, the opponents of reform succeeded in gaining the upper hand in the election of delegates. Ernst Muhri was able to prevent Marek and other reformers from being voted out of office at the party conference – especially because it could have split the party. Nevertheless, Marek retired from the Political Bureau and resigned his function as editor-in-chief of *Weg und Ziel*¹⁰⁷. From this point on, Marek formulated his thoughts (from 1970 as editor-in-chief) in the journal *Wiener Tagebuch*, which had already largely emancipated itself from the party during the reform years. In a correspondence to Lucio Lombardo Radice, a member of the CC and an important intellectual of the PCI, Marek described the events during the party congress as «a revenge of the Stalinists with considerable support from Soviet and SED comrades»¹⁰⁸. The situation became even more acute in 1969. Ernst Fischer sharply criticized the Soviet Union and the situation in the common camp. As a result, he was expelled from the KPÖ in May. The attempt by the reform advocates to overturn this decision in October failed in a narrow vote in the divided party¹⁰⁹. All

¹⁰² M. Mugrauer, «Prager Frühling», cit., p. 1052.

¹⁰³ M. Graf, S. Knoll, *Franz Marek*, cit., p. 74.

¹⁰⁴ *Informazione sul P.C. austriaco di Dino Pelliccia*, 31/10/1968, FIG, APCI, Esteri, mf. 552, p. 96.

¹⁰⁵ *Riunione della Direzione*, 18/9/1968, FIG, APCI, Direzione, b. 20, pp. 939-1037.

¹⁰⁶ M. Graf, *The Rise and Fall of «Austro-Eurocommunism»*, cit.

¹⁰⁷ M. Mugrauer, «Prager Frühling», cit., pp. 1053-55.

¹⁰⁸ *Letter of Franz Marek to Lucio Lombardo Radice*, 16/1/1969, FIG, APCI, Fondo Lucio Lombardo Radice, Corrispondenza Mal-Mar, fasc. Marek, Franz.

¹⁰⁹ M. Mugrauer, «Prager Frühling», cit., p. 1054.

this did not go unnoticed in Italy. Almost overnight one was confronted with a new situation, even if the signs of a power struggle had already been recognized before. The Italian party leadership and especially the members of the Central Committee, who had built up friendly relations with Marek, Fischer and others over the years, were shocked. Lucio Lombardo Radice, who maintained regular exchanges with Marek and Fischer, said: «Such a comrade will be expelled by the KPÖ? That means suicide»¹¹⁰. Dino Pelliccia summed up the «new crisis» in the KPÖ for the leadership of the PCI and remarked on the drama that had developed «around the Fischer case»¹¹¹. The group around Marek denounced these developments and 27 members of the Central Committee, who criticized the party and its actions, delivered an ultimatum¹¹². Thus, the conflict within the KPÖ only gained further drama. The PCI also felt these developments. Erwin Scharf contacted Rome, condemning Marek's work and accusing him of falsely referring to the Italian party, when presenting his arguments. At the same time, the Italian communist press was accused of siding with «factionist» groups in Austria¹¹³. After an internal discussion¹¹⁴, Carlo Galluzzi answered Vienna that «the press of the PCI did not participate in a factionist activity in another party in the past, today or in the future.» Moreover, the Austrian comrades were advised to exercise their freedom of countering any argument they did not like by supplying their version in party media, whereas the PCI had always followed the rule of thoroughly informing its members about international developments¹¹⁵. This was far from satisfactory for the leaders of the KPÖ, the PCI was apparently siding with the minority group within the Austrian party.

Indeed, the reform experiment was buried at the latest with the extraordinary XXI party congress of the KPÖ in May 1970. Thus, the KPÖ's line was again aligned with the Soviet Union and the reformers were pushed out of the party. Franz Marek's publications in the *Wiener Tagebuch* were the final pretext for his expulsion from the party in November 1970¹¹⁶. The party marked these events with a further shift to a «re-Stalinization» of the KPÖ, culminating in the retraction of its condemnation of the events around the 1968 «Prague spring» in 1971¹¹⁷.

A new role

The events around 1968 and their consequences within the KPÖ had contributed to a complete «normalization» of the party in the Soviet sense. Leading intellectuals

¹¹⁰ *Letter of Lucio Lombardo Radice to Ernst Fischer, 8/10/1969*, FIG, APCI, Fondo Lucio Lombardo Radice, Corrispondenza FI-FO/FR-FU, fasc. Fischer, Ernst.

¹¹¹ *Nota informativa di Dino Pelliccia, 31/10/1969*, FIG, APCI, 1969, CL 176.

¹¹² M. Mugrauer, «*Prager Frühling*», cit., pp. 1054 e sg..

¹¹³ *ZK der KPÖ an das ZK der KPI, 4/2/1970*, FIG, APCI, Estero, mf. 70, pp. 1222-23.

¹¹⁴ *Renato Sandri a Carlo Galluzzi, 9/2/1970*, FIG, APCI, Estero, mf. 70, p. 1227.

¹¹⁵ *Carlo Galluzzi al CC del PC Austriaco, 5/3/1970*, FIG, APCI, Estero, mf. 70, pp. 1228-29

¹¹⁶ M. Graf, S. Knoll, *Franz Marek*, cit., pp. 81 e sg.

¹¹⁷ M. Mugrauer, «*Prager Frühling*», cit., p. 1060

and reform-minded cadres left the KPÖ or were expelled. However, the reform process, which manifested itself in many Western European parties, did not end for the PCI. It is true that within the Italian party the «left» and «right» wings were seething as well, and the example of the group around *Il Manifesto*¹¹⁸, which suffered the fate of expulsion, shows that even the PCI was not spared fierce discussions. Nevertheless, the party continued the path of reform, even more clearly from March 1972 with Enrico Berlinguer as its new secretary general. The excluded members of the KPÖ formed an important intellectual bastion in the 1970s. The thoughts formulated by Franz Marek and Ernst Fischer received attention on the Apennine peninsula. Franz Marek's *Zur Struktur des Stalin-Mythos* (On the Structure of the Stalin Myth¹¹⁹), a contribution prepared during the events of summer 1968, was printed in *Rinascita* in March 1969¹²⁰. In it, Marek explained the «deformations» under Stalin and why his «myth» determined three decades of history of the workers' movement. At that time, Marek had not yet been expelled and the criticism of his writing was enormous within the KPÖ. He lamented to Ernesto Ragionieri that in the week in which «Rinascita printed my Stalin myth [...] an "Anti-Marek" attack was launched with GDR means, 40 pages only about this article. In this brochure I am no longer a comrade, but merely a revisionist [...]. They have no other worries»¹²¹. Ragionieri and Marek had long been united by a common passion for Antonio Gramsci's thoughts. When Ragionieri visited Vienna in March 1966, he talked with Marek about the situation in Austria and the risk of right-wing dominance in politics. In addition, the speech fell on Marek's interest in the work of Antonio Gramsci. He wanted to publish a book about his life and work in German. Ragionieri told the party leadership in Rome: «We should do everything we can to ensure that the book appears next year, on the 30th anniversary of Gramsci's death [...], in order to propagate his significance for socialism in Europe [...]. Marek has all the prerequisites to carry out this work»¹²². Ragionieri probably also knew Marek's February 1966 article in *Weg und Ziel*, in which the Austrian had already analysed Gramsci's life and above all his work¹²³. Its importance was also confirmed by the various events held in honour of Gramsci in 1967. In April, an international congress on «Gramsci studies» was held in Cagliari. Among the «important philosophers» who visited Italy on this occasion were Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek¹²⁴. *l'Unità* praised Marek's contribution to the study of the person of Gramsci. *Critica Marxista* assigned him a prominent place on the 30th anniversary of Gramsci's death. Marek described the

¹¹⁸ See: R. Rossanda, *La ragazza del secolo scorso*, Einaudi, Torino 2007.

¹¹⁹ F. Marek, *Zur Struktur des Stalin-Mythos*, in «Weg und Ziel 25», n. 11, 1968, pp. 548-77.

¹²⁰ Id., *Sulla struttura del mito di Stalin*, in «Rinascita», n. 13, 28/3/1969.

¹²¹ *Franz Marek to Ernesto Ragionieri*, 3/4/[1969], Biblioteca E. Ragionieri - Sesto Fiorentino, Fondo Ernesto Ragionieri, Corrispondenza, No. 1286.

¹²² *Informazione sul viaggio a Vienna di Ernesto Ragionieri (17-20 Marzo 1966)*, 22/3/1966, FIG, APCI, Esteri, mf. 536, pp. 1004-16.

¹²³ F. Marek, *Antonio Gramsci*, in «Weg und Ziel 24», n. 2, 1966, pp. 99-109.

¹²⁴ *Si prepara il convegno di studi gramsciani*, in «l'Unità», 21/2/1967.

Italian party founder as «the greatest Marxist philosopher of the interwar period»¹²⁵. *l'Unità* saw Marek's comments as confirmation of Gramsci's thoughts and his significance for the entire international workers' movement. Thus, Marek was named among the most important Marxist intellectuals on an international level¹²⁶. *Rinascita* also discovered Marek as a commentator on Marx and printed his thoughts for the Italian audience¹²⁷.

In 1968 Marek published no less than four articles in *Rinascita*, emphasizing his importance as an intellectual. The following assessment of his work *La filosofia della Rivoluzione*, published by the PCI's *Editori Riuniti*, is one such example: «From Marx to Lenin, from Gramsci to Stalin, from Kautsky to Mao Zhe Dong, the strategy and development of the workers' movement today and its complex problems are [explained] in a complete synthesis of the debate within the Marxist movement»¹²⁸. Moreover, on 14 November, *l'Unità* advertised this publication on half a page. The KPÖ was called a small party that played an important role in the theoretical debate. According to Lucio Lombardo Radice, Marek, who «had a profound knowledge of the writings of Gramsci and Togliatti,» took a special place among the communist theorists¹²⁹. In the East, however, the KPÖ's theoretical work was described as weak. This shows how the different currents within the communist movement perceived each other. In the 1970s, Marek also participated together with Georges Haupt, Ernesto Ragionieri, Eric Hobsbawm, Vittorio Strada and Corrado Vivanti in the publication of the volumes on *Storia del Marxismo*, published by *Einaudi*¹³⁰.

In fact, the importance of Marek and Ernst Fischer for the Italian communists did not cease after their expulsion. On the occasion of Fischer's death in the summer of 1972, the philosopher and theorist was not only remembered as a «beloved comrade and friend» but his and Marek's work after the expulsion from the KPÖ were described as «still revolutionary and brilliant»¹³¹. The words of the two Austrians were recommended to the Italian comrades in order to better understand the thoughts of Gramsci and Togliatti. The party leadership of the KPÖ sharply criticized this article in a letter to Rome and a response appeared in the November issue of *Weg und Ziel*. Franz Muhri and Erwin Scharf asserted that this could be «seen as interference of the PCI in the affairs of the KPÖ»¹³². The response of Enrico Berlinguer, who had only been party leader since March, to the accusations from Vienna was very clear. He was «negatively surprised» in his letter to Muhri and Scharf and defended

¹²⁵ F. Marek, *Gramsci e il movimento operaio dell'Europa Occidentale*, in «Critica Marxista», n. 3, 1967.

¹²⁶ *Il filo rosso da Gramsci a oggi*, in «l'Unità», 7/5/1967.

¹²⁷ F. Marek, *Marx Vivo*, in «Rinascita», n. 19, 10/5/1968, p. 32.

¹²⁸ *Filosofia della rivoluzione*, in «l'Unità», 19/10/1968.

¹²⁹ *Il socialismo per cui combattiamo. Un libro del marxista austriaco Franz Marek come contributo a un'antologia delle teorie rivoluzionarie*, in «l'Unità», 14/11/1968.

¹³⁰ Aa.Vv., *Storia del Marxismo*, 5 vol., Einaudi, Torino 1978-1982.

¹³¹ *La controversia per Pegaso*, in «l'Unità», 8/9/1972.

¹³² *ZK der KPÖ an das ZK des PCI, Generalsekretär Enrico Berlinguer, gez. Franz Muhri, Erwin Scharf*, 29/9/1972, FIG, APCI, 1972, Esteri, mf. 53, p. 1101.

the line of the PCI and the articles of the party newspaper¹³³. A similar incident in 1973 shows that the Italian communists were much closer to Marek and Fischer's ideas than to those of the KPÖ leadership. When the *Editori Riuniti* published Ernst Fischer's *Erinnerungen und Reflexionen* (Memories and thoughts), another sharp letter was sent to the leadership of the PCI: «From the anti-Soviet magazine "Wiener Tagebuch", we learned that the PCI publishing house [...] printed Ernst Fischer's book [...] with a foreword by Ernesto Ragionieri, a member of the Central Committee of the PCI. This fact causes astonishment and alienation, because it was not usual until now for a communist party to take a stand against another communist party through its publications»¹³⁴. In the letter signed by Muhri and Scharf, they made it clear that they did not believe that such a publication was opportune. After all, it was «incomprehensible to us what the PCI needed the publication of this book for, although it was obvious from the outset that this meant a snub to a – albeit small – brother party. This is aggravated by the preface, which not only does not distance itself from the anti-Soviet attacks directed against the KPÖ, but on the contrary gives an essentially positive assessment of the book»¹³⁵. The Italian party leadership discussed the matter in early January 1974. Armando Cossutta was charged with answering on behalf of the party. He replied with clear words to the accusations from Vienna: «We would like to point out that the publication took place within the frame of autonomy of our publishing house. Furthermore, we would like to make it clear that this publication in no way constitutes a breach by our publishing house of its obligations to your party, nor is it a violation of the principles governing relations between the communist parties»¹³⁶. In fact, Lombardo Radice also affirmed the importance of the Austrian comrades in intellectual discourse in a letter to Sergio Segre, stressing that it «is unfathomable that we should not maintain "normal" relations with the only German-speaking group that explicitly refers to Gramsci, while the "Tagebuch" prints articles from *Rinascita* in translation in almost every issue. Let's keep decent relations with the [...] ghost party¹³⁷, but these cannot be exclusive [and] go hand in hand with a "ban" on relations with the "Tagebuch"»¹³⁸.

In the second half of the 1970s with Enrico Berlinguer as party leader, the Italian communists recognized NATO and took an increasingly open stance against Moscow¹³⁹. The thoughts of Marek were no less important in this phase. In the anthology of *Storia del marxismo contemporaneo* a contribution by Marek appeared¹⁴⁰,

¹³³ Enrico Berlinguer a Franz Muhri e Erwin Scharf, 18/10/1972, FIG, APCI, 1972, Esteri, mf. 53, p. 1106.

¹³⁴ Lettera di Franz Muhri e Franz Scharf della KPÖ a Enrico Berlinguer, 5/12/1973, FIG, APCI, 1973, CL 245.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Armando Cossutta al CC del PCA, 17/1/1974, FIG, APCI, CL 27.

¹³⁷ «Gespenstpartei», written in German.

¹³⁸ Lucio Lombardo Radice a Sergio Segre, 7/11/1975, FIG APCI, Fondo Lucio Lombardo Radice, Corrispondenza Mal-Mar, fasc. Marek, Franz.

¹³⁹ See: N. Dörr, *Die rote Gefahr*, cit.; N. Dörr, *Emanzipation und Transformation. Rückblick auf den Eurokommunismus*, in «Osteuropa 63», n. 5/6, 2013, pp. 255-70

¹⁴⁰ F. Marek, *Socialismo sovietico e rivoluzione mondiale in Stalin*, in: *Annali*, Istituto Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, *Storia del marxismo contemporaneo*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1973, pp. 964-79.

showing the interest of the Italian communists in his thoughts. Moreover, the introduction to the posthumously published work by Ernesto Ragionieri on the 3rd International was written by Marek¹⁴¹. When a research institute was established in Florence in February 1979 in memory of Ragionieri, who died in 1975, Marek was among the speakers. He emphasized the importance of Ragionieri in the propagation of Gramsci's thoughts in Austria and Germany. After all, the personality and works of the Italian party founder had united the two men for many years. Marek was also elected to the committee of the institute¹⁴².

In the context of «Eurocommunism», Marek's work after the expulsion was also important. The *Wiener Tagebuch* contains a chronicle of debates and events in Europe. Marek let many dissidents from Eastern Europe and representatives of the Western European CPs have their say. He was always involved in the debate on «Eurocommunism» and criticised the Italian, French and Spanish CPs in the first half of the 1970s for not doing enough to denounce the mistakes in Eastern Europe. When the Conference of European Communist Parties was held in Moscow in 1976, however, he was pleased to note that the three Western CPs refrained from referring «to the democratic achievements of the Eastern European countries» and that in the West they «declared their support for all freedoms that do not exist in the Eastern European countries.» He also remarked: «It is certainly not an equilateral triangle that has emerged in Latin Europe, but there is a certain consensus on crucial issues of autonomy, democracy and socialism – a fact that is politically far more important than the question of a conference of the Communist Parties of Europe»¹⁴³. Until the end of his life Marek did not stop pointing out that even the hopefuls of the renewal of communism did not always point clearly enough to the mistakes in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, he defended the «Eurocommunist» parties against all attacks from Moscow or its allies. For him, openness, dialogue and discussion were the only paths for renewal of the communist movement¹⁴⁴.

When Franz Marek died in June 1979, there was great sympathy in communist circles in Italy. The long article by Franco Andreucci in *l'Unità* on 1 July testifies to this. Marek was «a first-rate protagonist of the rebirth of Marxism in the 1950s and 1960s [...]. Aware that the centre of gravity of the communist movement in Western Europe had moved away from the German sphere, he was also always involved in the communist life of Italy. In his newspaper, he followed the developments and problems of Eurocommunism with the clear intelligence inherent to him. He studied Labriola, Gramsci, Togliatti and worked like no other [...] for their reception in the German cultural sphere. [...]. In his intense relationship with the history of Marxism, with the events of communism, Marek managed to maintain the balance between the passionate experience of a militant and the criticism that only great

¹⁴¹ E. Ragionieri, *La terza internazionale e il partito comunista italiano*, Einaudi, Torino 1978.

¹⁴² *L'istituto Ragionieri nuovo strumento di ricerca storica*, in «l'Unità», 11/2/1979; *Franz Marek ricorda Ernesto Ragionieri*, in «l'Unità», 15/2/1979.

¹⁴³ F. Marek, *Gleichseitiges Dreieck?*, in «Wiener Tagebuch I», 1976, pp. 11-12.

¹⁴⁴ M. Graf, S. Knoll, *Franz Marek*, cit., pp. 98-100.

intellectual personalities are capable of [...]. To the workers' movement, to Marxism and the idealistic struggle for the implementation of original forms of socialist revolution in the capitalist West, Franz Marek has dedicated all his life, all his intellectual energy, his wisdom, his gentle nature and his passionate personality»¹⁴⁵.

The PCI sent three comrades to Marek's funeral and the sympathy of his companions and friends was enormous. The letters of condolence addressed to his wife ranged from Pietro Ingrao, Franco Andreucci, Lucio Lombardo Radice (all PCI) and Rossana Rossanda (*Il Manifesto*) to Eric Hobsbawm. Throughout Europe, newspapers and magazines recalled this protagonist of European Marxism.

Conclusions

Franz Marek was born at the end of the Habsburg Monarchy and grew up in the Jewish milieu of the «Red Vienna». He experienced the rise of dictatorships in Austria and Germany, was politically active since his youth and discovered communism in the climate of right-wing authoritarianism in Europe. In the underground, first in Austria and later in France, he found his purpose in life: to fight for the ideals of a communist order. After the end of the war, he worked in Austria as a functionary, intellectual and politician in the Communist Party, but over the years, he discovered more and more that the path led by the «homeland» of socialism could not be the right one for him. His occupation with intellectuals and Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci helped him to carry out a critical examination of his own ideas. He also came closer and closer politically to the Italian PCI, in which he placed his hopes for a reform of international communism. His own reform path led the KPÖ for several years to the top of the reform-oriented parties, and in some cases the policy of the Austrian reformers also went too far for the PCI. Overall, however, a great unity between Vienna and Rome emerged in international discussion forums, in questions of political orientation and the path to socialism. The driving force behind these developments was the circle of reformers around Franz Marek, even though this has largely fallen into oblivion. The proximity that had developed between the reform wing of the KPÖ and the PCI is reflected in the way in which the Austrians expelled from the KPÖ were treated in the 1970s. Whether as a political interlocutor or Marxist philosopher and theorist, in both cases the PCI was interested in the words of Franz Marek and fascinated by his theoretical thoughts. His studies of Gramsci were the proverbial cherry on the cake. Not only did he not become an outlaw, the exchange continued to intensify, and he was involved to some extent in all theoretical discussions of the PCI, even though this posed a problem for many a brother party.

As a concluding remark, one can note that the current lack of an international reception of Franz Marek is certainly to be criticized. Studies on the connections

¹⁴⁵ *Un protagonista del marxismo europeo*, in «l'Unità», 1/7/1979; *È morto in Austria il compagno Marek*, in «l'Unità», 30/6/1979.

between intellectuals and the exchange of ideas outside the classical «Eurocommunist» camp will show in the future, which complex and fascinating dynamics hide behind such slogans and developments.